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INTRODUCTION 
Should directors and officers1 be personally liable in tort for gunshot 
wounds sustained by a mall patron after management reduced mall security 
in order to maximize profits?  Should directors be personally responsible 
for failing to install exterior lighting when the failure to do so led to a 
resident being robbed and attacked in her condominium unit?  Should 
directors and officers be liable for negligently managing underwriting risks 
or for failing to detect misconduct by employees? 
Today, directors and officers can incur personal liability to non-
shareholder third parties in all of these and many other instances based on 
their inadequate management or failure to supervise corporate affairs and 
subordinates.2  Due to the lack of legal protections in this area, corporate 
directors and officers face personal liability risks that can substantially 
diminish or eliminate their entire personal wealth.  For example, in one 
case, the president and CEO of a company was held personally liable for 
over $132 million for mismanagement.3  Yet, unlike claims that are brought 
by shareholders, the law governing tort claims by non-shareholder third 
parties against directors and officers remains an area that is largely 
neglected by legal scholars. 
However, the current approaches to directors’ and officers’ tort liability 
for claims involving inadequate supervision and management in the 
corporate context are in need of repair.  Courts faced with tort-based 
supervision and management cases frequently fail to consider that 
directors’ and officers’ duties to supervise and manage generally exist only 
in relation to the corporation, but not in relation to third parties.  In 
addition, current approaches neglect the separate corporate personality of 
the corporation, unduly shift the risk of doing business to directors and 
                                                           
 1. In this Article, the term “officer” means a corporation’s president, chief financial 
officer, chief accounting officers, vice presidents of principal business units and any person 
with significant policy-making functions.  This wording is roughly in line with the definition 
of “officer” in Rule 16a-1 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a. 
 2. See infra Part II. 
 3. Omaha Indem. Co. v. Royal Am. Managers, Inc., 777 F. Supp. 1488, 1492 (W.D. 
Mo. 1991). 
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officers, and undermine the heightened liability protections provided by 
corporate law.4   
Moreover, the threat of personal liability for directors and officers is also 
increasing.  On the one hand, courts increasingly rely on a growing body of 
statutory law that holds directors and officers liable for acts and omissions 
related to supervision and management, even in the absence of any 
wrongdoing and solely based on the director’s or officer’s corporate status 
and position of authority.5  On the other hand, in most cases plaintiffs will 
attempt to hold directors and officers personally liable when the 
corporation is insolvent or bankrupt and where the potential individual 
defendants are wealthy or covered by liability insurance.6  Because of the 
recent financial crisis, scenarios in which corporations are insolvent or 
forced into bankruptcy are rising.7  In addition, it is now also possible to 
imagine a scenario where an entity that provides directors’ and officers’ 
liability insurance becomes insolvent or bankrupt, adding to the increased 
vulnerability of directors and officers to liability claims. 
Typically, cases holding directors and officers liable for supervision and 
management failures involve closely held corporations.8  Consequently, 
commentators could mistakenly dismiss the issue as largely irrelevant for 
directors and officers of large publicly held corporations. 
Yet, because the rules to assess tort-based liability do not vary with the 
size or type of corporation that is involved,9 directors and officers of public 
companies can also face considerable risks of personal liability for 
supervision and management.  For example, class action litigants in 
products liability cases may claim that the board’s or management’s failure 
                                                           
 4. The importance of the issues surrounding directors’ and officers’ liability has often 
been downplayed due to director and officer (“D&O”) insurance policies or the existence of 
indemnification agreements between the individual and the corporation. However, 
protection offered by insurance or indemnification—if in place at all—is incomplete.  See 
infra Part IV.C. 
 5. See infra Parts I.D., II.B. 
 6. In this context, it is helpful for plaintiffs that the stay provision of the Bankruptcy 
Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (2000), does not generally apply to solvent directors and 
officers as co-defendants of a debtor corporation.  See, e.g., Oklahoma Federated Gold and 
Numismatics, Inc. v. Blodgett, 24 F.3d 136, 141 (10th Cir. 1994) (noting that tort claims 
against an officer are not subject to the automatic stay). 
 7. Moreover, plaintiffs can use suits against directors and officers strategically for 
their nuisance value and as a tool to exercise added pressure in settlement negotiations. 
 8. For example, the supervision and management cases cited in Part II of this article 
all concern directors and officers of closely held corporations.  The size of these 
corporations, however, varies widely and range from a small drinking establishment to a 
large national food chain. 
 9. Compare Leitch v. Hornsby, 935 S.W.2d 114, 117 (Tex. 1996) (applying the 
typically used test under Texas law of whether an officer owed an independent duty of 
reasonable care to the plaintiff to evaluate claims against the defendant of a closely held 
corporation), with McCaskey v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 2d 562, 577 (S.D. Tex. 
2001) (applying the same test to the defendant Chief Executive Officer of a publicly held 
corporation). 
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to supervise and manage led to their injuries.  In fact, plaintiffs continue to 
bring claims against directors and officers in the context of mass torts10 and 
products liability.11  A recent example of directors’ and officers’ exposure 
in this regard is provided by a wrongful death class action suit filed against 
a publicly held manufacturer of a diabetes drug and its directors and 
officers.12 
Moreover, the current rapid increase in bank failures has also given rise 
to tort-based claims against banks’ executives and board members, such as 
lawsuits by uninsured depositors alleging negligent management and 
oversight.13  With financial markets’ continuing problems, these types of 
lawsuits have the potential to evolve into real personal threats to directors 
and officers, namely if plaintiffs can convince courts to grant them standing 
to bring their claims directly.14 
Because of the risks to directors’ and officers’ personal liability for 
supervision and management, and the shortcomings with the current 
                                                           
 10. See Mark J. Roe, Corporate Strategic Reaction to Mass Tort, 72 VA. L. REV. 1, 13 
(1986) (noting, however, that payment out of managers’ personal assets is a remote risk).  
For example, at one time during the asbestos related class-action lawsuits against Johns-
Manville, there were approximately 1,000 cases pending with past and present directors, 
officers, and employees of Manville named as defendants, most of which involved claims 
by Manville employees for failure to warn of potential hazards in the work place.  See In re 
Johns-Manville Corp., 33 B.R. 254, 263 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (staying asbestos injury 
suits against Johns-Manville managers).  Nationwide, the potential damage claims against 
directors, officer, and employees at the time of the decision were in excess of $230,000,000.  
Id. at 260. 
 11. See, e.g., In re Ephedra Prods. Liab. Litig., 478 F. Supp. 2d 624, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007) (holding that the sole shareholder, director, and officer of a corporate marketer/seller 
may be personally liable in toxic-tort products action for consequences of his acts, 
regardless of any showing that the defendant was the corporation’s alter ego).  However, 
courts will be disinclined to allow products liability claims against directors or officers 
absent a specific showing of an affirmative direction, sanction, participation, or cooperation 
in the production, inspection, maintenance, or sale of a defective product.  See Lobato v. Pay 
Less Drug Stores, Inc., 261 F.2d 406, 409 (10th Cir. 1958); Ruzzo v. LaRose Enters., 748 
A.2d 261, 270 (R.I. 2000).  Conversely, it may suffice to incur liability when an executive 
makes or condones false statements about a product. Marsh v. Usk Hardware Co., 132 P. 
241, 247–48 (Wash. 1913). 
 12. See Complaint for Damages at 3, Hoffman v. Smithkline Beecham Corp.,  
No. BC410935 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 2009), 2009 WL 890200. 
 13. See Michael R. Smith & Benjamin Lee, Uninsured-Depositor Litigation:  An 
Emerging Threat to Directors and Officers of Troubled Banks?, 14 ANDREWS LITIG. REP. 1 
(2008). 
 14. See id.  Courts have held that creditors may maintain direct actions against directors 
and officers on the basis of mismanagement if they sustained an identifiable loss peculiar 
and personal to themselves.  However, where misconduct resulted in loss to the corporation 
and its creditors generally, the right of action belongs to the corporation and must be 
maintained by it or its receiver.  See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Minges, 473 F.2d 918, 921 
(4th Cir. 1973); Finch v. Southside Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 685 N.W.2d 154, 167 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 2004); Speer v. Dighton Grain, Inc., 624 P.2d 952, 961 (Kan. 1981).  There is also 
debate over the existence of the tort of “deepening insolvency,” but that debate is beyond 
the scope of this article.  For a discussion of the merits of “deepening insolvency” claims 
from a Delaware perspective see Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 
A.2d 168, 205–07 (Del. Ch. 2006) (rejecting the doctrine). 
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approaches to imposing liability in these cases, this Article argues that the 
test for imposing personal liability on directors and officers should be 
revised.  Under the revised approach, courts should focus strictly on the 
nature of the duty and the officer or director’s state of mind.  Consequently, 
under this revised approach, tort-based personal liability for directors and 
officers for breaches of duties owed to the corporation is limited to cases in 
which they act fraudulently or with the intention to inflict harm upon third 
parties.  In addition, directors and officers remain liable for breaches of 
duties owed to third parties provided, however, that their conduct was at 
least grossly negligent. 
Before delving into the revised approach in greater detail, this Article 
begins by outlining in Part II the general rules governing directors’ and 
officers’ liability vis-à-vis non-shareholder third parties for torts committed 
in their official capacities.  Part III describes how courts apply these rules 
to hold directors and officers liable in tort for failures to supervise and 
manage corporate affairs and subordinates.  Part IV argues that the current 
approaches for adjudicating tort-based supervision and management claims 
in the corporate context are, for the most part, inadequate and lack the 
necessary protections for directors and officers.  Finally, Part V explores 
the revised approach by offering an alternative model of corporate tort 
liability that is duty-based. 
Throughout this Article, the focus will be solely on directors’ and 
officers’ tort liability toward non-shareholder third parties in the context of 
supervision and management.15  Furthermore, although some of the 
arguments put forward in this Article in support of the revised liability 
model may also apply to other legal entities—such as Limited Liability 
Companies or Limited Liability Partnerships—and their agents, the present 
discussion will be limited to the liability of directors and officers of 
corporations.16 
                                                           
 15. Actions by a corporation or shareholders against its directors and officers, claims 
under securities laws, and criminal law sanctions will not be addressed.  For a thorough 
analysis of managerial liability in the context of fraud on the market, see Jennifer H. Arlen 
& William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability For Fraud On Securities Markets:  Theory And 
Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 720–21 (1992) (proposing a regime of agent liability 
and criminal enforcement, but distinguishing liability for fraud on the market from other 
corporate tort liabilities). 
 16. The practical and doctrinal problems that imposition of personal tort liability on 
directors and officers creates are not limited to the corporate form.  However, the issues are 
likely to be more prevalent in the case of business forms with limited liability, whether 
incorporated or not.  Limited liability may increase the need for creditors to pursue their 
claims against directors, officers, LLC managers, or other individuals personally because it 
can make it more difficult to fully recover from the entity itself.  In addition, without limited 
liability, the problem is also less pronounced, as it is likely that individuals who were held 
personally liable are in a better position to recover indemnification payments under 
agreements with their entity, since these indemnification claims will not be wiped out in 
bankruptcy. 
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I. AN OVERVIEW OF TORT LIABILITY FOR DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS 
Courts tend to impose personal liability on corporate directors and 
officers for their torts on the basis that an agent, even if acting on someone 
else’s behalf, is personally liable for his or her tortious conduct.17  
Following this general principle, a director18 or officer remains personally 
responsible for his own torts, even if committed while acting in the scope 
of his employment and in his official capacity as director or officer of a 
corporation.19  Personal liability attaches even though the director or officer 
performed the acts for the benefit of the corporation and without personally 
benefiting thereof.20  If a plaintiff so chooses, he may proceed against the 
corporation, against the director or officer individually, or against both the 
individual actor and the corporation.21 
                                                           
 17. General agency principles posit that an individual is personally liable for all torts he 
commits, notwithstanding that the person may have acted as an agent or under directions of 
another.  See Bowles v. Ruppel, 157 F.2d 944, 946 (3d Cir. 1946); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF AGENCY § 7.01 (2006); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY  
§§ 343–44 (1957).  When an agent acts affirmatively and causes physical harm, the rule is 
clear that the fact that he is acting as an agent does not relieve him from liability.  
Difficulties sometimes occur with respect to an agent’s conduct which results merely in 
pecuniary loss to the plaintiff and to what can be referred to as nonfeasance or a failure by 
the agent to perform an act which he ought to do.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 
350–57, Reporter’s Notes (2008); infra Part I.A. 
 18. A director is not, by virtue of his position, the corporation’s agent (or “employee”) 
for the purposes of vicarious tort liability; rather, a plaintiff must show that the necessary 
degree of control existed.  Norris v. Sackett, 665 P.2d 1262, 1263 (Or. Ct. App. 1983).  See 
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14C cmt. a–b (2006). 
 19. See Browning-Ferris Indust. of Ill., Inc. v. Ter Maat, 195 F.3d 953, 956 (7th Cir. 
1999); Coastal Abstract Serv., Inc. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 173 F.3d 725, 734 (9th Cir. 
1999); Faulk v. Milton, 268 N.Y.S.2d 844, 847(N.Y. App. Div. 1966) ( “[A] director’s 
common law liability for his tort persists although it may be within the scope of his 
corporate duties and in furtherance of the objects of the corporation.”); Schaefer v. D & J 
Produce, Inc., 403 N.E.2d 1015, 1019 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978) (“Officers are agents of the 
corporation and their liability to third persons is governed by the ordinary principles of 
agency.”).  On the other hand, deviating from what appears to be a well-settled principle, 
some courts have posited that absent evidence that an officer of a corporation committed 
any tort outside the scope of his capacities as officer, he may not be held individually liable.  
See, e.g., Cantwell v. City of Boise, 191 P.3d 205, 216 (Idaho 2008) (“An agent is only 
liable for actions which are outside its scope of duty to the corporation.”); Bernstein v. 
Starrett City, Inc.,  
758 N.Y.S.2d 658, 659 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (explaining that defendant officer was 
entitled to summary judgment since he established that he did not act in his individual 
capacity or commit any tort outside the scope of his capacity as corporation’s president); 
Kramer v. Twin County Grocers, 542 N.Y.S.2d 787, 788 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (mem.); see 
also Accuimage Diagnostics Corp. v. Terarecon, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 2d 941, 950 (N.D. Cal. 
2003) (suggesting that in order to hold a corporate officer personally liable for his tortious 
acts, plaintiff must allege actionable conduct outside of the scope of the officer’s 
employment); Rodriguez v. 1414-1422 Ogden Ave. Realty Corp., 758 N.Y.S.2d 43, 44 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (noting that an action against a corporate president was properly 
dismissed absent any showing that he had acted in other than his corporate capacity or 
committed an independent tort). 
 20. See, e.g., Huffman v. Poore, 569 N.W.2d 549, 557–58 (Neb. Ct. App. 1997); Saltiel 
v. GSI Consultants, Inc., 788 A.2d 268, 273 (N.J. 2002). 
 21. See, e.g., Frances T. v. Vill. Green Owners Assn., 723 P.2d 573, 580 (Cal. 1986); 
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Still, at common law, directors and officers are not personally liable for 
the torts of a corporation or of any other agent merely because of their 
position.22  Instead, some additional connection is required.23  Courts have 
developed various approaches to test whether a director or officer has a 
sufficient enough connection to a particular tort to hold him personally 
liable.24  For the most part, the different theories or approaches overlap to a 
certain degree and courts can apply combinations or variations of the 
theories.  Nevertheless, the theories can be roughly divided into three 
approaches:  first, and most common, where the court focuses on the 
defendant’s participation in a tort; second, where the court focuses on 
whether a personal duty was breached; and third, where the court pierces 
the corporate veil.  In addition, directors and officers can incur liability 
under a plethora of statutory provisions. 
A. Focus on Participation 
In order to assess liability, courts will typically focus on whether a 
director or officer participated in the tortious act.25  Courts sometimes refer 
                                                           
Ray-Tek Servs., Inc. v. Parker, 831 N.E.2d 948, 958 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005); Palomino Mills, 
Inc. v. Davidson Mills Corp., 52 S.E.2d 915, 918–20 (N.C. 1949); Strang v. Hollowell, 387 
S.E.2d 664, 666 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that an officer’s liability is joint and several 
with his corporate employer).  Since a director or officer who committed a tort in his scope 
of employment will be jointly and severally liable together with the corporation, a plaintiff 
will not be able to “double dip.”  In other words, a tort victim can apportion his damages to 
the director/officer and the corporation or to only one of these parties, but the total amounts 
recovered must not be larger than his damages. 
 22. See, e.g., Bernstein, 758 N.Y.S.2d at 659 (finding that the defendant officer was 
entitled to summary judgment because “he did not act in his individual capacity or commit 
any tort outside the scope of his corporate capacity as president of [the corporation].”); 
WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS 
§ 3.13 (7th ed. 2002).  Personal liability based on corporate status may, however, be 
imposed by statute.  See infra Part I.D. 
 23. See Bowling v. Holdeman, 413 N.E.2d 1010, 1014 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (providing 
that without a connection to the tort liability does not attach simply because the defendant is 
the president of the company). 
 24. For a recent comparative overview of approaches to directors’ tort liability across 
various common law jurisdictions, see Helen Anderson, Directors’ Liability for Corporate 
Faults and Defaults—An International Comparison, 18 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J.  
1, 34–44 (2009). 
 25. E.g., Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., 273 F.3d 120, 133 (2d Cir. 2001); Steinke v. 
Beach Bungee, Inc., 105 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 1997); Indiaweekly.com, L.L.C v. 
Nehaflix.com, Inc., 596 F. Supp. 2d 497, 507 (D. Conn. 2009); Lemon v. Harlem 
Globetrotters Intern., Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1110 (D. Ariz. 2006); Mill Run Assocs. v. 
Locke Prop. Co., 282 F. Supp.2d 278, 287 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (“[it is a] general, if not 
universal, rule . . . that an officer of a corporation who takes part in the commission of a tort 
by the corporation is personally liable therefor . . . .”); Gidwitz v. Stirco, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 
825, 830 (N.D. Ill. 1986); T.V. Spano Bldg. Corp. v. Dep’t of Natural Res. and Env’t 
Control, 628 A.2d 53, 61 (Del. 1993); BTL COM Ltd., Co. v. Vachon, 628 S.E.2d 690, 695 
(Ga. Ct. App. 2006); Livonia Bldg. Materials Co. v. Harrison Const. Co., 742 N.W.2d 140, 
144 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007) (per curiam); State ex rel. The Doe Run Res. Corp. v. Neill, 128 
S.W.3d 502, 505 (Mo. 2004); Walker v. Anderson, 232 S.W.3d 899, 918 (Tex. App. 2007); 
Consulting Overseas Mgmt, Ltd. v. Shtikel, 18 P.3d 1144, 1147 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).  
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to this as the “participation theory.”26  In a leading case on the issue, 
Lobato v. Pay Less Drug Stores,27 the Tenth Circuit explained the 
circumstances under which directors and officers may become liable in tort 
to a third party based on their participation.28  The court explained that, as a 
rule, a corporate officer or agent is personally liable to third parties if he 
sanctions, directs or actively participates in the commission of a tort.29  An 
officer or other corporate agent, the court held, may also be liable for an act 
or omission from which a tort necessarily follows or may be reasonably 
expected to follow.30 
Participation, in this context, can take many different forms.  For 
instance, it can be sufficient for a director to incur liability if he votes in 
favor of a board decision, which later results in harm to a third party,31 or 
for a director or officer to be the “guiding spirit” or “central figure” behind 
a tortious act.32  Furthermore, it may also suffice that a director or officer 
has constructive knowledge of a tort.33  Finally, directors and officers can 
be liable if they “reasonably” should have known that some hazardous 
condition or activity under their control could injure a third party, but they 
negligently failed to take or order appropriate action to avoid the harm.34 
Some courts limit the application of the participation theory and, 
drawing upon an old distinction between an agent’s acts of nonfeasance 
                                                           
The focus on participation does not mean that there is no requirement of the breach of a 
duty.  However, the duty requirement is not a central aspect of the analysis.  See infra note 
47. 
 26. See, e.g., Bethea v. Bristol Lodge Corp., No. Civ. A. 01-612, 2002 WL 31859434, 
at *14 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 18, 2002); Wicks v. Milzoco Builders, Inc., 470 A.2d 86, 90  
(Pa. 1983). 
 27. 261 F.2d 406, (10th Cir. 1958). 
 28. See id. at 408–09. 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. 
 31. See Frances T. v. Vill. Green Owners Ass’n, 723 P.2d 573, 586 (Cal. 1986)  
(en banc) (stating that a director who votes for the commission of a tort is liable even though 
the act was committed in the name of the corporation). 
 32. See Cruz v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 619 F.2d 902, 907 (1st Cir. 1980) (citing Donsco, 
Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602, 605–06 (3d Cir. 1978)); Marks v. Polaroid Corp., 237 
F.2d 428, 435 (1st Cir. 1956). 
 33. See Childs v. Purll, 882 A.2d 227, 239 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (inferring that the two 
defendant officers could be held personally liable for their company’s torts because they 
were the only two officers and ran the company together); Cotten v. Weatherford 
Bancshares, Inc., 187 S.W.3d 687, 701 (Tex. App. 2006) (“A corporate officer may be held 
individually liable for a corporation’s tortious conduct if he knowingly participates in the 
conduct or has either actual or constructive knowledge of the tortious conduct.”); Bowling 
v. Ansted Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge, Inc.,  
425 S.E.2d 144, 149 (W. Va. 1992) (finding that the defendant officer could be found liable 
for the corporation’s torts based on constructive knowledge of the culpable conduct).  But 
see Accuimage Diagnostics Corp v. Terarecon, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 2d 941, 950 (N.D. Cal. 
2003) (“[M]ere knowledge of tortious conduct by the corporation is not enough to hold a 
director or officer liable for the torts of the corporation absent other ‘unreasonable 
participation’ in the unlawful conduct by the individual.”). 
 34. Frances T., 723 P.2d at 584 (discussing directors’ liability). 
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and acts of misfeasance or malfeasance,35 hold that a corporate director or 
officer cannot be personally liable for nonfeasance.36  Under this line of 
cases, a director or officer is not personally liable for mere omissions or the 
nonperformance of acts that he had a duty to carry out.  Courts sometimes 
explain that in cases of nonfeasance, the claimed negligence consists only 
of failing to perform a duty owed to the principal, which is why the person 
injured has a cause of action only against the principal, but not against the 
agent.37  Nevertheless, the modern rule is that personal liability can attach 
regardless of whether the breach was a result of misfeasance or 
nonfeasance.  Thus, courts can impose personal liability for “participation” 
solely based on failures to act.38 
B. Focus on Duty 
Both the Restatement (Second) of Agency and the Restatement (Third) 
of Agency state that, generally, an agent’s breach of a duty owed to the 
principal is not an independent basis for the agent’s tort liability to a third 
                                                           
 35. For a discussion of the distinction between misfeasance, malfeasance, and 
nonfeasance, see Atl. Coast Line R. Co. v. Knight, 171 S.E. 919, 920–24 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1933).  See also Haupt v. Miller, 514 N.W.2d 905, 908–09 (Iowa 1994) (en banc); Schaefer 
v. D & J Produce, Inc., 403 N.E.2d 1015, 1019–21 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978); Buck v. Clauson’s 
Inn at Coonamessett, Inc., 211 N.E.2d 349, 351 (Mass. 1965). 
 36. See Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Aero Voyagers, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 579,  
585 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding that the defendants’ failure to supervise the corporation’s 
employees and failure to learn about the corporation’s financial condition were insufficient 
bases for imposing liability); Peguero v. 601 Realty Corp., 2009 WL 196314, at *2 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2009) (“. . . personal liability cannot be imposed on a corporate officer for 
nonfeasance . . . .”); Lutz Feed Co., Inc. v. Audet & Co., Inc., 337 N.Y.S.2d 852, 856 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1972) (granting the defendant officer’s motion to dismiss because the complaint 
alleged only that he failed to act); Shay v. Flight C Helicopter Serv., Inc., 822 A.2d 1, 17–19 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (explaining the difference between misfeasance and nonfeasance); 
Brindley v. Woodland Vill. Rest., Inc., 652 A.2d 865, 868–70 (Pa. Super. 1995) 
(characterizing the plaintiff’s claim, which was premised on the unsafe condition of the 
corporation’s restrooms, as nonfeasance as against the defendant officers). 
 37. See, e.g., Mathis v. Yondata Corp., 480 N.Y.S.2d 173, 177 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984). 
 38. See, e.g., Haupt, 514 N.W.2d at 909 (“In determining liability of a corporate officer 
for negligence, it is difficult to logically support a legal distinction that exonerates a 
corporate officer’s act of nonfeasance while exacting retribution for acts of misfeasance or 
malfeasance.  In practice, applying such labels may be more descriptive and thus conclusory 
than the facts would justify as a difference.  Accordingly, we join the modern trend of 
jurisdictions applying the general negligence standard, rather than predicating individual 
corporate officer liability for negligence on a prerequisite finding of misfeasance or 
malfeasance.”); Miller v. Muscarelle, 170 A.2d 437, 446–49 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1961) (tracing the historical roots of the distinction between malfeasance and misfeasance, 
concluding that the distinction today “resolves itself into little more than a totally illogical 
remnant of the privity doctrine”); Schaefer v. D & J Produce, Inc., 403 N.E.2d 1015, 1020 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1978) (“In any event, we question whether any benefit can be derived by 
attaching the labels ‘misfeasance’ or ‘nonfeasance’ to particular activity.”); Fields v. Jantec, 
Inc., 857 P.2d 95, 97 (Or. 1993) (en banc) (refusing to distinguish between misfeasance and 
nonfeasance in evaluating the plaintiff’s claim); 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney, 520 So. 2d 
1276, 1283 (La. Ct. App. 1988), rev’d on other grounds, 538 So. 2d 228 (La. 1989) (holding 
that an officer’s personal liability is independent of whether the breach of his duties was 
accomplished through malfeasance, misfeasance or nonfeasance). 
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party.39  Thus, conduct that breaches an agent’s duties to his principal does 
not necessarily subject the agent to liability to a third party even though the 
agent’s conduct also harms the third party.40  Instead, according to the 
Restatements of Agency, an agent is only subject to tort liability to a third 
party harmed by his conduct when such conduct constitutes a breach of 
duty the agent personally owes to the third party.41 
More specifically, the Restatement (Second) of Agency as well as 
commentary to the Restatement (Third) of Agency distinguish between 
purely economic harm and physical harm, i.e. between harm to property 
and harm to persons.42  Both Restatements provide that an agent who fails 
to perform duties owed solely to his or her principal is not liable to a third 
party who has only suffered harm to his or her economic interests.43  
Conversely, an agent may be liable to a third party for physical harm, even 
if the third party incurs such harm because of the agent’s failure to 
adequately perform his or her duties to the principal.44 
In accordance with these principles, numerous courts have specifically 
stressed that, in order to be liable for his or her actions within the corporate 
context, a director or officer must breach an independent duty of care, 
which he personally owes to the injured party.45  Such specific inquiry as to 
the existence of a duty has the potential to serve as a protective device for 
directors and officers carrying out their corporate duties.  Courts, however, 
often recognize the existence of a personal duty based upon the defendant’s 
personal participation in or direction of a tortious act.46  As a result, the 
                                                           
 39. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.02 (2006); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
AGENCY §§ 352, 357 (1984).  
 40. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.02 cmt. b (2006). 
 41. Id. at § 7.02. 
 42. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.02 cmt. c-d (2006); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 352, 357 (1984). 
 43. See supra note 42. 
 44. See supra note 42.  In general, the rule of the agent’s non-liability for economic loss 
is an overstatement, given the many instances of liability for economic loss.  See Greg Allen 
Constr. Co. v. Estelle, 798 N.E.2d 171, 174–75 (Ind. 2003) (listing examples of situations 
where liability was premised on economic loss from negligent misrepresentation); infra Part 
II.A (listing examples where liability for economic harm was premised on negligent 
misrepresentations). 
 45. E.g., Lawlor v. District of Columbia, 758 A.2d 964, 975 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Frances 
T. v. Vill. Green Owners Assn., 723 P.2d 573, 581 (Cal. 1986) (en banc); Michaelis v. 
Benavides, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 776, 778 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); Cisneros v. U.D. Registry, Inc., 
46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 233, 255–56 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (duty imposed by statute on company, 
not officer personally); White v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,  
918 So. 2d 357, 358 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); West v. Bruner Health Group, Inc., 866 So. 
2d 260, 269 (La. Ct. App. 2003); Donnelly v. Handy, 415 So. 2d 478, 480  
(La. Ct. App. 1982) (stating that Louisiana courts have consistently employed a duty-based 
analysis in determining officers’ personal liability for injury to third parties); Leitch v. 
Hornsby, 935 S.W.2d 114, 117 (Tex. 1996). 
 46. See, e.g., McCaskey v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 2d 562, 577 (S.D. Tex. 
2001) (requiring the plaintiff to show that the defendant director breached an independent 
duty of care). 
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focus on the existence of a personal duty to the plaintiff can become 
indistinguishable from a participation-based approach and often does not 
serve as an added barrier to holding directors or officers personally liable.47 
Another group of cases that focus on duty uses an alternative inquiry to 
ascertain personal liability.  Under this approach, a director or officer will 
be liable for a tort where (1) the corporation owed a duty of care to the 
victim; (2) the corporation delegated that duty to the director or officer; and 
(3) the director or officer breached the duty of care by his or her own 
conduct, causing injury to the victim.48  While this test also focuses on the 
existence of a duty, because courts assume that any duty can be delegated 
to and create additional liabilities for directors and officers, it disregards 
the existence of internal duties that directors and officers owe only to the 
corporation.  In addition, courts using this test fail to appreciate that 
delegation of internal duties does not transform them into duties that 
directors and officers owe to third parties.49 
C. Veil Piercing 
A third approach to holding directors and officers personally liable for 
tortious acts is by piercing the corporate veil.50  Under this doctrine, a 
                                                           
 47. Granted, courts which focus mainly on whether a director or officer participated in 
tortious conduct also require that there exists a duty to a third party.  See supra Part I.A.  
Indeed, “[w]here there is no duty, there can be no negligence.” Robillard v. Asahi Chem. 
Indus. Co., 695 A.2d 1087, 1094 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1995) (quoting Anthony v. Connecticut 
Co., 92 A. 672, 674 (1914)).  However, these courts do not explicitly discuss the 
requirement that the defendant director or officer breaches a duty that he personally owes to 
the injured party.  Thus, it is unclear how these participation-based cases deal with the duty 
requirement, i.e. whether they implicitly assume that participation in a certain act or whether 
direct or foreseeable contact by itself creates the necessary duty, whether they work under 
the assumption that the corporation owed a duty which it then delegated to the individual 
director or officer, or whether they follow yet another approach. 
 48. E.g., Manning v. United Med. Corp. of New Orleans, 902 So. 2d 406, 410–12 (La. 
Ct. App. 2005); Downey v. Callery, 338 So. 2d 937, 943–944 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (per 
curiam), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 955 (1977); Saltiel v. GSI Consultants, Inc.,  
788 A.2d 268, 272 (N.J. 2002) (treating the requirement of a duty being delegated to and 
breached by a director or officer as part of the “participation theory”); Metuchen Sav. Bank 
v. Pierini, 871 A.2d 759, 764 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005); Schaefer v. D & J Produce, 
Inc., 403 N.E.2d 1015, 1020–21 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978).  Courts that use this test have 
sometimes pointed out that if the defendant’s general responsibility has been delegated with 
due care to some responsible subordinate or subordinates, he is not himself personally at 
fault and liable for the negligent performance of this responsibility unless he personally 
knows or personally should know of its nonperformance or malperformance and has 
nevertheless failed to cure the risk of harm.  See, e.g., Manning, 902 So. 2d at 411. 
 49. See infra Part III.A (discussing the distinction between internal and external duties). 
 50. See, e.g., Gidwitz v. Stirco, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 825, 829–30 (N.D. Ill. 1986) 
(explaining that where the individual is considered the “alter ego” of the corporation, courts 
may disregard the separate corporate existence and impose liability on the individual); 
Maggio v. Becca Const. Co., 644 N.Y.S.2d 802, 803 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (granting the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss because the plaintiff failed to show that the defendant officers 
treated the corporation as their alter ego).  The doctrine is perhaps more commonly known 
as a tool by which courts may hold shareholders, but not directors or officers, liable for the 
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separate corporate identity may be disregarded and liability imposed upon 
an individual if a court finds that the corporation is controlled and operated 
in a manner that makes it a “mere instrumentality of another” and that the 
“observance of the fiction of separate existence would, under the 
circumstances, sanction fraud or promote injustice.”51  Interestingly, under 
a veil-piercing approach, courts can find directors and officers personally 
liable in cases where they did not participate in the tortious acts and where 
there would be no liability under participation or duty-based theories.52 
D. Statutory Liability 
In addition to the possibility of incurring liability under general tort and 
agency theories, directors and officers can be civilly and criminally liable 
under a growing collection of regulatory statutes.  These include the 
National Banking Act,53 the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,54 the 
Lanham Act,55 the Patent Act,56 the Copyright Act,57 the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act,58 the Fair Credit Reporting Act,59 the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA),60 the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,61 and the 
                                                           
debts of the corporation.  A classic case in point is Walkovsky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6, 8–
10 (N.Y. 1966), which discusses the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil within the 
context of shareholder liability specifically. 
 51. Gidwitz, 646 F. Supp. at 830 (citing Main Bank of Chicago v. Baker,  
427 N.E.2d 94, 101 (Ill. 1981)); see also Lambert v. Kazinetz, 250 F. Supp. 2d 908, 914 
(S.D. Ohio 2003). 
 52. See Smith v. Hawks, 355 S.E.2d 669, 675–76 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (discussing the 
“piercing the corporate veil” exception to the general rule of non-liability for a corporate 
officer who did not participate in tortious conduct). 
 53. del Junco v. Conover, 682 F.2d 1338, 1341–42 (9th Cir. 1982) (explaining that § 93 
of the National Banking Act imposes liability on directors for violating, or allowing 
violations, of the banking laws). 
 54. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 676–77 (1975) (noting that the Federal Food, 
Drug and Cosmetic Act holds corporate officials responsible for remedying and preventing 
violations, including continuing violations, of the Act). 
 55. Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602, 606 (3d Cir. 1978) (explaining that the 
principle that a corporate officer is individually liable for torts he personally commits also 
applies to acts constituting unfair competition). 
 56. See, e.g., Hoover Group v. Custom Metalcraft, Inc., 84 F.3d 1408, 1412  
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting that, under the Patent Act, corporate officers are personally liable if 
they assist with the corporation’s infringement); see also Lynda J. Oswald, The Personal 
Liability of Corporate Officers for Patent Infringement, 44 IDEA 115–17 (2003) (criticizing 
the erosion of traditional protections provided to corporate officers in the area of patent 
infringement). 
 57. Feder v. Videotrip Corp., 697 F. Supp. 1165, 1177 (D. Colo. 1988) (stating that a 
corporate officer may be held liable if he or she is responsible for the corporation’s 
copyright infringement).   
 58. United States v. Am. Radiator & Std. Sanitary. Corp., 433 F.2d 174, 188  
(3d Cir. 1970) (noting that a corporate officer is subject to prosecution under § 1 of the 
Sherman Act whenever he or she knowingly participates in violations of the Act).   
 59. Mone v. Dranow, 945 F.2d 306, 308 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (noting that 
federal and state law holds corporate officers are personally liable for their torts even if they 
were committed on the corporation’s behalf). 
 60. Leddy v. Standard Drywall, Inc., 875 F.2d 383, 387–88 (2d Cir. 1989) (explaining 
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Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),62 among 
others.  Furthermore, environmental statutes such as the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),63 
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),64 and others are 
significant sources of directors’ and officers’ liability.65 
The prerequisites for personal liability for tort-like statutory violations 
vary and depend on the specific statute.  However, the various statutory 
liabilities display some common themes.  First, a marked difference 
between common law liability theories and regulatory statutes that can 
impose personal liability is that the latter may extend civil and criminal 
liability without a need to demonstrate intent or negligence.66  Second, 
regulatory statutes may impose liability on “controlling persons” who 
would normally not be liable under traditional corporate, tort, or agency 
law principles.67  Under these statutes, some federal and state courts impose 
liability on individual corporate actors through the “responsible corporate 
officer doctrine,”68 a theory of liability separate from piercing the corporate 
                                                           
that a corporate officer with operational control who is directly responsible for a failure to 
pay statutorily required wages can be personally liable for the shortfall). 
 61. For example, directors and officers may incur liability under Sarbanes-Oxley’s 
document destruction and whistleblower provisions.  See Sarbanes-Oxley Act 18 U.S.C. § 
1513 et seq. 
 62. Lode v. Leonardo, 557 F. Supp. 675, 680 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (“Congress did not limit 
the scope of RICO to those involved in what has traditionally been thought of as organized 
crime.”). 
 63. See, e.g., Sidney S. Arst Co. v. Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund, 25 F.3d 417, 420–
21 (7th Cir. 1994) (adopting an expanded standard of liability under CERCLA); United 
States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 743 (8th Cir. 1986) (opining that 
“construction of CERCLA to impose liability upon only the corporation and not the 
individual corporate officers and employees who are responsible for making corporate 
decisions about the handling and disposal of hazardous substances would open an 
enormous, and clearly unintended, loophole in the statutory scheme”);  
New York v. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d 1032, 1052–53 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that individuals 
can be considered “owners” or “operators” under CERCLA). 
 64. United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 745–46 (1986). 
 65. See KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 22, §§ 10.01–10.06 (summarizing the potential 
liability corporate directors face in connection with violations of various environmental 
laws). 
 66. Timothy P. Glynn, Beyond “Unlimiting” Shareholder Liability:  Vicarious Tort 
Liability for Corporate Officers, 57 VAND. L. REV. 329, 357 (2004). 
 67. Id. 
 68. See, e.g., Comm’r, Dept. of Envtl. Mgmt. v. RLG, Inc., 755 N.E.2d 556, 559 (Ind. 
2001) (explaining that an individual, though acting in a corporate capacity as an officer, 
director, or employee, may be individually liable under Indiana environmental management 
laws either as a responsible corporate officer, as a direct participant under general legal 
principles, or under specific statutes or provisions).  The responsible officer doctrine is often 
traced back to United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943), where the Supreme Court 
allowed criminal liability to be imposed on a corporate officer under the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938.  Id.  The Court held that any persons who have a 
responsible share in the furtherance of the transaction which the Act outlaws could be 
personally liable.  Id. at 284–85.  The theory has subsequently been applied in the context of 
criminal as well as civil liability.  See, e.g., People v. Roscoe, 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 187, 193 n.4, 
195 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (utilizing the responsible corporate officer doctrine to impose civil 
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veil or imposing personal liability for direct participation in tortious 
conduct.69 
The responsible corporate officer doctrine holds that a director, officer, 
or other corporate actor may be personally liable if:  (1) the individual is in 
a position of responsibility which allows the individual to influence 
corporate policies or activities; (2) there is a nexus between the individual’s 
position and the violation in question such that the individual could have 
influenced the corporate actions which constituted the violations; and (3) 
the individual’s actions or inactions facilitated the violations.70  Courts 
have usually applied the doctrine in the context of offenses against public 
welfare related statutes that impose strict liability schemes,71 such as in the 
context of violations of federal or state environmental legislation.72  
However, courts have used the doctrine in various other areas as well.73  In 
particular, a notable recent development in this regard is evidenced by 
attempts to enforce actions alleging Foreign Corrupt Practices Act74 
violations against corporate officials based on a “control person” theory.75 
II. DIRECTORS’ AND OFFICERS’ TORT LIABILITY FOR SUPERVISION AND 
MANAGEMENT 
As demonstrated in the preceding section, various approaches exist for 
determining whether directors and officers can incur personal liability for a 
myriad of torts committed in their official capacity.  This Part focuses on 
two particular, and often interrelated, types of torts for which directors and 
officers can be held personally liable:  supervision and management of 
corporate affairs and subordinates.  The first section outlines judicial 
approaches to directors’ and officers’ tort liability for supervision and 
                                                           
liability, but noting that the distinction between civil and criminal liability is irrelevant). 
 69. Celentano v. Rocque, 923 A.2d 709, 721 n.11 (Conn. 2007) (explaining the 
rationale for implementing the responsible corporate officer doctrine). 
 70. Matter of Dougherty, 482 N.W.2d 485, 490 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).  
 71. See Microsoft Corp. v. Ion Tech. Corp., 484 F. Supp. 2d 955, 962 (D. Minn. 2007) 
(declining to apply the doctrine to consider liability for copyright infringement); Celentano, 
923 A.2d at 722–23. 
 72. E.g., United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 743–44  
(8th Cir. 1986); Roscoe, 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 191–95; Comm’r, Dept. of Envtl. Mgmt.,  
755 N.E.2d at 560–62; State v. Rollfink, 475 N.W.2d 575, 580 (Wis. 1991). 
 73. See, e.g., Monarch Marking Sys., Inc. v. Duncan Parking Meter Maint. Co.,  
No. 82 C 2599, 1986 WL 3625, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 1986) (anti-trust violation); 
Wittenberg v. Gallagher, No. 1 CA-CV 01-0168, 2001 WL 34048121, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
Nov. 20, 2001) (securities violations); Miller v. Santa Rosa Sales and Mktg., Inc., 475 
N.W.2d 210, 219–20 (Iowa 1991) (consumer fraud). 
 74. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat 1494 (1977) (codified in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C.). 
 75. See Kevin LaCroix, 3ew Exposure for Corporate Officials:  Control Person 
Liability for FCPA Violations, D&O DIARY, Aug. 24, 2009, 
http://www.dandodiary.com/2009/ 08/articles/foreign-corrupt-practices-act/new-exposure-
for-corporate-officials-control-person-liability-for-fcpa-violations. 
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management under common law negligence theories while the second 
section discusses analogous claims based on statutory provisions. 
Interestingly, the rules to assess directors’ and officers’ tort-based 
liability for supervision and management do not differ based on the various 
types of defendants or corporations that are involved.  Rather, courts appear 
to apply the various tests—as used in their respective jurisdiction—
regardless of whether the defendant is a director or officer, an inside 
director or an outside director, or whether the corporation is closely or 
publicly held.76  Yet, the cases reviewed for the purposes of this section—a 
number too small to be of any empirical relevance—indicate that both the 
risk of being a defendant and the likelihood of incurring liability in a 
supervision or management case are higher for officers and inside directors, 
as opposed to outside directors.77 
A. Common Law 3egligence Claims 
Following from the general principle that directors and officers may be 
liable for torts committed in their corporate capacities, courts can hold 
directors and officers personally liable for the torts of negligent supervision 
and management with regard to corporate activities and subordinates.78 
Methods for ascertaining liability for supervision and management can 
vary.  Some courts analyze these types of claims by inquiring into whether 
the defendant participated in tortious conduct.79  Other courts focus on the 
requirement of the breach of a personal duty.80  Still other courts appear to 
treat supervision and management related claims as a sui generis category 
of torts, different from general tort liability, based on participation in or 
                                                           
 76. Of the cases reviewed for this article, none contained any language that would 
indicate that courts make such express distinctions.  See also supra note 9 and 
accompanying text. 
 77. This is probably because officers and inside directors are in closer proximity to their 
corporation’s daily business than outside directors, a fact sometimes implicitly 
acknowledged by courts in their definition of the scope of a defendant’s duty. See, e.g., 
Lowell Hoit & Co. v. Detig, 50 N.E.2d 602, 604 (Ill. App. Ct. 1943) (“The duties [to 
supervise] of a general manager of a corporation are usually more extensive than those of a 
mere director.”). 
 78. E.g., Jabczenski v. S. Pac. Mem. Hosps., 579 P.2d 53, 58 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978); 
Smith v. Isaacs, 777 S.W.2d 912, 914–15 (Ky. 1989); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
AGENCY § 358(1) (1958) (“The agent of a disclosed or partially disclosed principal is not 
subject to liability for the conduct of other agents unless he is at fault in appointing, 
supervising, or cooperating with them.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 877 (1979) 
(summarizing liability for harm resulting from the directed conduct of another). 
 79. E.g., Adel v. Greensprings of Vermont, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 2d 692, 700  
(D. Vt. 2005); Omaha Indem. Co. v. Royal Am. Managers, Inc., 777 F. Supp. 1488, 1492 
(W.D. Mo. 1991); Detig, 50 N.E.2d at 603–04; Smith, 777 S.W.2d at 914–15. 
 80. E.g., Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Aero Voyagers, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 579, 585 
(S.D.N.Y. 1989); Shay v. Flight C Helicopter Servs., Inc., 822 A.2d 1, 17–19  
(Pa. Super. 2003); Inter-Ocean Cas. Co. v. Leccony Smokeless Fuel Co., 17 S.E.2d 51, 53–
54 (W.Va. 1941). 
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knowledge of an illegal act.81  In these latter cases, the test appears to be 
simply whether there were negligent supervisory or managerial acts, which 
led to harm incurred by a third party.  In addition, courts may also rely on a 
combination of the aforementioned approaches.82 
Principally, a director or officer cannot be individually liable for 
negligent supervision or management where the claim relates primarily to a 
breach of contract, not negligence.83  Nevertheless, there are cases 
involving successful supervision and management claims against directors 
and officers, even where there was an underlying agreement between the 
plaintiffs’ and the defendants’ respective corporate employers.84 
In general, the tort of negligent supervision sanctions not an act, but 
rather an omission.  Thus, a director or officer may be liable for failures in 
the supervision and control of corporate affairs85 as well as for torts 
committed by agents of the corporation if he or she fails to act with due 
diligence in his or her supervision.86  The latter is especially true in cases 
where there is not only a single, isolated incident, but where the agents’ 
tortious acts occur persistently and continuously for substantial periods of 
time and the director or officer had the opportunity to discover the 
wrongful acts.87  Similarly, courts can impose liability where directors or 
officers are negligent in failing to learn of and prevent torts by 
employees.88  Nevertheless, directors and officers are not required to 
                                                           
 81. See Jabczenski, 579 P.2d at 58 (identifying three distinct bases of personal liability 
for corporate torts under Arizona law:  (1) participation; (2) knowledge amounting to 
acquiescence, and; (3) negligent management and supervision); accord Avery v. Solargizer 
Intern., Inc., 427 N.W.2d 675, 681 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (“Generally, a corporate officer is 
not liable for torts of the corporation’s employees unless he participated in, directed, or was 
negligent in failing to learn of and prevent the tort.”). 
 82. E.g., Frances T. v. Vill. Green Owners Assn., 723 P.2d 573, 583–86 (Cal. 1986) (en 
banc) (articulating considerations for determining liability based on various standards). 
 83. E.g., Westminster Const. Co., v. Sherman, 554 N.Y.S.2d 300, 301–02  
(N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (mem.) (explaining the limitation of corporate officer liability in the 
context of contracts). 
 84. E.g., Omaha Indem. Co., 777 F. Supp. at 1492 (W.D. Mo. 1991); Sergeants 
Benevolent Ass’n Annuity Fund v. Renck, 796 N.Y.S.2d 77, 80–81 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005). 
 85. E.g., Cameron v. Kenyon-Connell Commercial Co., 56 P. 358, 361 (Mont. 1899) 
(stating that directors may be liable where they fail to exercise reasonable diligence in the 
control and supervision of the corporate business); see also Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 
616 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (holding that an allegation that a director failed to devote adequate 
attention to his company’s affairs stated a cause of action in tort where proper attention 
would have avoided loss). 
 86. See, e.g., Air Traffic Conference of Am. v. Marina Travel, Inc., 316 S.E.2d 642, 
645 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (finding insufficient factual support to establish that the defendant 
neglected to exercise due care in choosing trustworthy employees or that she had fair 
opportunity to discover a diversion of company proceeds). 
 87. See Lowell Hoit & Co. v. Detig, 50 N.E.2d 602, 603 (Ill. App. Ct. 1943);  
Air Traffic Conference of Am., 316 S.E.2d at 645. 
 88. E.g., Avery v. Solargizer Int’l., Inc., 427 N.W.2d 675, 681 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); 
Preston-Thomas Const., Inc. v. Cent. Leasing Corp., 518 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Okla. Ct. App. 
1973) ( “[The e]xistence of circumstances and facts which would arouse the suspicions of an 
ordinary prudent business man will furnish a basis” for directors’ or officers’ personal 
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personally supervise all of the details of every business transaction.89  
Instead, directors can delegate the management of the daily business to 
subordinate officers as long as they do not divest themselves of the duty of 
general supervision and control of the corporate affairs.90 
In contrast, the situations in which the rather elusive tort of negligent 
management may arise are more difficult to describe in general terms.  The 
tort of negligent management can consist both of an action, such as an 
improper management decision, as well as an omission, such as a failure to 
properly manage a business or a  
specific aspect thereof.  Often, courts will not even explicitly refer to 
“negligent management” or “mismanagement” when imposing tort liability 
based upon alleged managerial failures.  It is therefore best to look at some 
practical examples of cases involving management and supervision 
claims—which tend to overlap—to trace the contours of these two torts. 
With respect to supervision and management cases involving harm to 
persons, for example, the Montana Supreme Court held that directors could 
be potentially liable for the death of a person killed by an explosion in their 
corporate warehouse where the directors did not exercise reasonable 
diligence in the control and supervision of the corporate business.91  In 
another case, the Nebraska Supreme Court found a sufficient cause of 
action for negligence where an officer failed to properly train and supervise 
a trenching machine operator because the operator’s action resulted in the 
plaintiff’s death and the supervisor knew or should have known that the 
machine operator would perform the job assigned to him negligently.92  
The Supreme Court of California recognized a cause of action against 
individual board members of a condominium owner’s non-profit 
corporation for alleged negligence in the board members’ decision not to 
provide adequate lighting where an intruder attacked a resident in her 
condominium unit.93  Similarly, a New York court held that individual 
                                                           
liability if they failed “to make reasonable inquiry and act with due care regarding the 
suspicions”).  But cf. Becker v. Tools & Metals, Inc., No. 3:05-CV-0627-L, 2009 WL 
577604, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2009) (holding that under California law, a corporate 
officer did not have a legal duty to uncover alleged fraud). 
 89. E.g., Myers & Chapman, Inc. v. Thomas G. Evans, Inc., 374 S.E.2d 385,  
393–94 (N.C. 1988); Preston-Thomas Const., Inc., 518 P.2d at 1127. 
 90. Detig, 50 N.E.2d at 603 (limiting the extent to which a director can delegate 
responsibility to subordinates). 
 91. Cameron v. Kenyon-Connell Commercial Co., 56 P. 358, 361 (Mont. 1899).  In 
another case, however, corporate officers were not personally liable for an explosion in their 
sugar company and resulting damages to employees, neighbors, and an additional non-
employee plaintiff in absence of showing of any negligence on their part or any basis for res 
ipsa loquitur inference against them.  Moak v. Link-Belt Co., 229 So. 2d 395, 416 (La. Ct. 
App. 1970), rev’d in part on other grounds, 242 So. 2d 515, 520–21 (La. 1970). 
 92. Carlson v. Metz, 532 N.W.2d 631, 634–36 (Neb. 1995).   
 93. Frances T. v. Vill. Green Owners Assn., 723 P.2d 573, 584–86 (Cal. 1986)  
(en banc). 
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officers of companies associated with a shopping mall, who reduced or 
eliminated security measures to maximize profits, could be personally 
liable to a patron who sustained injuries during a shooting incident at the 
mall.94  Finally, the Supreme Court of Ohio denied the defendants summary 
judgment in a case where the plaintiffs claimed that directors who operated 
a city-owned coliseum, but who failed to implement security measures 
designed to protect rock concert patrons from a dangerous condition caused 
by a first-come-first-served seating policy, should be held personally 
liable.95 
Negligent supervision and management claims have also found some 
success in cases involving purely economic loss.  For example, the 
president and CEO of a reinsurance management firm was held personally 
liable to a reinsurer for the amount of $132.3 million when he failed to 
exercise due care in evaluating and monitoring underwriting risks assumed 
on behalf of the reinsurer.96  Possible negligent management and 
supervision by a school’s director and corporate president precluded 
summary judgment on students’ claim that the director should be held 
personally liable for corporate torts resulting from an employee’s alleged 
misrepresentations relating to education, housing, and job placement 
assistance to students.97  Finally the New York Supreme Court, Appellate 
Division found a cognizable claim against an investment advisory firm’s 
officers for their alleged mismanagement in relation to investment advice 
and negligent supervision of a portfolio manager.98 
There are courts, however, that are clearly disinclined to hold directors 
and officers personally liable for negligent supervision and management.  
These courts have concluded, for example, that a failure to supervise or 
manage does not rise to the level of personal participation necessary to hold 
a director or officer personally liable.99  Courts may also rely on the 
principle that directors and officers cannot be liable for mere nonfeasance 
and, by characterizing lack of management and supervision as pure 
omissions, apply this theory to bar individual liability.100  The reluctance to 
                                                           
 94. Haire v. Bonelli, 870 N.Y.S.2d 591, 593 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008). 
 95. Bowes v. Cincinnati Riverfront Coliseum, Inc., 465 N.E.2d 904, 909–12 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1983). 
 96. Omaha Indem. Co. v. Royal Am. Managers, Inc., 777 F. Supp. 1488, 1492 (W.D. 
Mo. 1991). 
 97. Keams v. Tempe Tech. Inst., Inc., 993 F. Supp. 714, 724–26 (D. Ariz. 1997). 
 98. Sergeants Benevolent Ass’n Annuity Fund v. Renck, 796 N.Y.S.2d 77, 80–81 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2005). 
 99. E.g., Adel v. Greensprings of Vermont, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 2d 692, 700 (D. Vt. 
2005) (requiring that a corporate officer have either specifically or personally directed or 
participated in the commission of a tort in order to incur liability). 
 100. E.g., Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Aero Voyagers, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 579, 585 
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (failing to supervise employees constitutes nonfeasance and a violation of 
the duty owed to the corporation but does not make corporate officers or directors 
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impose liability for nonfeasance is usually coupled with the idea that 
instances of nonfeasance concern duties which are owed only to the 
corporation, but not to a third-party tort claimant.101  Finally, courts have 
declined to impose personal liability for supervision and management, 
without resorting to the nonfeasance/misfeasance dichotomy, based solely 
upon the idea that directors and officers owe these duties exclusively to the 
corporation, independent of whether the underlying alleged misconduct 
was characterized as an act or omission.102 
Following these approaches, courts have refused to find directors and 
officers personally liable for negligent supervision and management in 
cases such as the following:  a corporate president’s failure to adequately 
supervise a subordinate manager responsible for the clean water supply at a 
condominium complex;103 directors’ and officers’ failure to take deductions 
from employees’ wages to pay premiums on insurance policies in an 
insolvent corporation;104 the failure of a helicopter service company’s 
president to supervise the maintenance work of a mechanic that led to a 
flying accident;105 and directors’ and officers’ failure to prevent 
defalcations by properly supervising corporate employees.106 
B. Statutory Claims 
Supervision and management claims can also appear in the context of 
statutory liability for directors and officers.  Although most statutes 
generally do not include the terms “supervision” or “management,” they 
can impose obligations upon directors and officers that, upon closer 
examination, strongly resemble directors’ and officers’ duties to supervise 
or manage under common law or corporate laws.  This is particularly true 
                                                           
personally liable to third parties); U.S. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes, Inc., 463 P.2d 
770, 775 (Cal. 1970) (Finding that a corporate president and principal officer was not 
personally liable for negligent handling of a corporate client’s business); Shay v. Flight C 
Helicopter Services, Inc., 822 A.2d 1, 17–19 (Pa. Super. 2003) (failing to inspect work of 
subordinate constituted nonfeasance and was not considered a basis to impose personal 
liability on corporate officer); Inter-Ocean Cas. Co. v. Leccony Smokeless Fuel Co., 17 
S.E.2d 51, 53–54 (W.Va. 1941) (holding that in the absence of an active intent to deceive or 
defraud creditors, the officers and directors will not be liable for simple nonfeasance of a 
duty to the corporation or fraud in its management or mismanagement in the disposition of 
money or property); Webb v. Cash, 250 P. 1, 5–6 (Wyo. 1926) (finding that in the absence 
of deliberate or reckless conduct, state bank directors’ failure to know of statutory violations 
did not render the directors’ personally liable for the plaintiff’s resulting loss). 
 101. See Airlines Reporting Corp., 721 F. Supp. at 585 (classifying a duty to supervise as 
a duty owed to a corporation and refusing to extend personal liability to officers or directors 
for a breach of that duty). 
 102. E.g., Donnelly v. Handy, 415 So. 2d 478, 481 (La. Ct. App. 1982); see also infra 
note 138 and accompanying text. 
 103. Adel, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 700. 
 104. Inter-Ocean Cas. Co., 17 S.E.2d at 53–54. 
 105. Shay, 822 A.2d at 17–19. 
 106. Airlines Reporting Corp., 721 F. Supp. at 585. 
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for statutes that base liability on directors’ or officers’ control or 
responsibility for a company or certain aspects of its business operations 
because under these statutes, the basis of the defendants’ liability is, in fact, 
lack of supervision or management.107 
For example, the “responsible corporate officer” doctrine allows courts 
to impose personal liability on corporate directors, officers, and other 
actors based solely on their corporate status and their authority to prevent 
certain violations of the law.108  Under the doctrine, even in the absence of 
an individual’s participation in or knowledge of a wrongful act, someone 
deemed a “responsible corporate officer” can be held liable for acts of 
corporate subordinates and for failures to prevent or correct such acts.109 
In an early case110 that applied the responsible corporate officer doctrine 
in the context of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,111 the Supreme 
Court opined that “individuals who execute the corporate mission”112 have 
a “positive duty to seek out and remedy violations of [the Act] when they 
occur” and “a duty to implement measures that will insure that violations 
will not occur.”113 
The court’s foregoing characterization of the duties in question is 
reminiscent of the duties imposed by common law supervision liability, 
which posits that directors or officers can be liable for failing to detect and 
prevent tortious conduct by employees.  The language of the holding also 
has a mismanagement dimension, as directors and officers may arguably 
minimize violations of food and drug regulations by taking the appropriate 
safety and organizational measures, both of which are dependent upon 
management decisions.114  In addition, the duty to implement measures to 
avoid future violations, as described by the court, appears to be analogous 
to directors’ and officers’ corporate law oversight duties under cases such 
                                                           
 107. See, e.g., infra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 108. See supra Part I.D.  
 109. See id.; Glynn, supra note 66, at 360 (noting that the doctrine imposes a form of 
liability on controlling persons that is “akin to vicarious liability”).  In at least one case, a 
corporate officer was personally liable for an environmental offense even though she did not 
take an active part in the business operations and never set company policy.  See Hawaii v. 
Kailua Auto Wreckers, Inc., 615 P.2d 730, 737–38 (Haw. 1980).  Furthermore, the doctrine 
also appears to create non-delegable duties for corporate managers.  In fact, delegation of 
duties may even bolster a claim that someone was a responsible officer in the sense of the 
doctrine.  As one court has noted:  “[S]ince delegation is done by those with a broad range 
of responsibilities, the delegation shows that the defendant was responsible for the overall 
operation of [the company’s] facility.”  State v. Rollfink, 475 N.W.2d 575, 580 (Wis. 1991). 
 110. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975). 
 111. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 301(k), 21 U.S.C. 331(k). 
 112. Park, 421 U.S. at 672. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See id. (Standing for the proposition that the “foresight” and “vigilance” required by 
United States v. Dotterweich, 230 U.S. 277 (1943) will include that “individuals who 
execute the corporate mission” implement measures that will insure that violations will not 
occur).   
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as In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation115 and its 
progeny.116 
Similar results have occurred in other areas such as violations of 
intellectual property statutes based on failures in exercising supervision.  In 
one case, a plaintiff brought a copyright infringement action in connection 
with the alleged use of a travel guide in the production of travel 
videotapes.117  The court confirmed that plaintiffs could assert a claim for 
copyright infringement against an officer who participated in his 
corporation’s infringing activities.118  However, the court also went on to 
explain that such claims need not necessarily allege that the individual had 
knowledge of and participated in the infringing conduct.119  Instead, a 
corporate officer who had the right and ability to supervise the infringing 
activity could be held personally liable.120 
Similarly, in another case alleging a violation of the Communications 
Act of 1934,121 an individual was held liable in her capacity as a corporate 
officer, director, shareholder, and principal.122  In order to establish 
liability, the plaintiff had to show that the defendant “had a right and ability 
to supervise the violations, and that she had a strong financial interest in 
such activities.”123 
III. PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH TORT-BASED LIABILITY FOR 
SUPERVISION AND MANAGEMENT 
Despite the numerous ways by which directors and officers can be held 
personally liable for supervision and management failures, augmenting the 
scope of directors’ and officers’ duties in these areas poses some problems.  
To be sure, an enlarged scope of duty for supervision and management can 
benefit tort victims by increasing the pool of potential defendants and 
available assets.  At the same time, however, an enlarged scope of duty for 
supervision and management fails to distinguish between the corporation’s 
                                                           
 115. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 116. See id. at 967–68 (holding that boards, regardless of any notice of actual 
wrongdoing, have a duty to assure themselves that reasonably designed information and 
reporting systems with regards to “the corporation’s compliance with law and its business 
performance” are in place); see also Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370  
(Del. 2006) (en banc), aff’g, No. Civ. A. 1570-N, 2006 WL 302558, at *1–2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 
26, 2006); In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 122–24 (Del. 
Ch. 2009). 
 117. Feder v. Videotrip Corp., 697 F. Supp. 1165, 1167 (D. Colo. 1988). 
 118. Id. at 1177–79. 
 119. Id. at 1179 
 120. Id. 
 121. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (2006). 
 122. J & J Sports Prod., Inc. v. Ribeiro, 562 F. Supp. 2d 498, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 123. See id. at 501 (quoting J&J Sports Prod., Inc., v. Meyers, No. 06 Civ. 5431, 2007 
WL 2030288, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2007)). 
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duties and directors’ and officers’ duties; fails to align corporate and tort 
law liability standards; neglects the corporate shield; and misaligns costs 
and benefits. 
A.  Distinguishing Between Internal and External Duties 
1. Internal versus external duties 
Cases holding directors and officers liable in tort for supervision and 
management, either under common law or based on tort-like statutory 
violations, share a common trait.  They work under the explicit or implicit 
assumption that directors and officers owe their duties of supervision and 
management of corporate affairs and subordinates to both the corporation 
and to third parties. 
Consequently, many courts dealing with common law tort claims based 
on supervision and management treat them like any other tort claim against 
corporate agents.  They ask whether a defendant was a participant in 
tortious conduct, or, if the particular court treats supervision and 
management as a separate species of torts, inquire into whether the 
defendant’s conduct was negligent and whether  
it was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s harm.124  If there is a statutory 
claim, the reasoning can be similar, but the bases for imposing liability can 
also be much broader.  Under certain statutes, it can suffice that a director 
or officer was in control of a company’s business operations in order to 
impose liability, regardless of any showing of actual participation or 
negligence.125 
On reflection, however, these approaches seem inadequate and 
overbroad for determining tort-based supervision and management claims.  
In the corporate context courts should, instead, begin by examining 
whether it was the corporation, the director or officer, or both who owed a 
duty to the third party.  Notably, courts should not assume that a director or 
officer owed a duty to a third party simply by virtue of his participation in 
an alleged tort or due to his negligence in carrying out (or failing to carry 
out) a certain act.  Because one can construe almost every aspect of 
corporate conduct to involve some sort of supervisory or managerial 
mistake—especially in smaller corporations in which directors and officers 
are involved in the daily operations—the threshold for holding directors 
and officers liable in tort is too easily met in the absence of a preliminary 
duty-focused analysis.  Similarly, liability based solely on a defendant’s 
position of authority within a company or control of certain business 
operations—a form of liability sometimes created by statute or judicial 
                                                           
 124. See supra Part II.A. 
 125. See supra Part II.B. 
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interpretation thereof—is equally inappropriate, since a corporate position 
of authority by itself should not create any duties to third parties. 
Accordingly, rather than only examining participation in an act, 
negligent conduct of the director or officer, or exercise of control over a 
business, courts should first examine the nature of the duty that allegedly 
has been breached and then determine to whom such duty is owed.126  
Generally, if the breach is of a purely internal duty, the director or officer 
should not be held liable because the duty is owed to the corporation.127 
Contrariwise, the director or officer may be held liable for the breach of 
an external duty because that duty is specifically owed to the third party.128  
To put it another way, courts must distinguish between a director or 
officer’s fiduciary duties to the corporation (and its shareholders) and a 
director or officer’s duty not to injure third parties under common law tort 
principles.129 
Of course, distinguishing between internal and external duties may be a 
challenging task for courts.130  Several considerations may be helpful in this 
regard.  One way to distinguish between internal duties (owed to the 
corporation) and external duties (owed to third parties) is to link the 
distinction with the difference between indirect and direct harm.  In cases 
of indirect harm, the director or officer’s conduct will not be the final link 
in the causal chain leading to the third party’s injury.  Instead, there will be 
other conduct or other causes that are in closer proximity to the harm 
actually incurred.  In other words, the injury is outside of the “scope” of the 
specific conduct in question.  Since indirect harm is often an indication of 
the breach of a purely internal duty, only the corporation should be liable to 
third parties for indirect harm in most cases.131 
                                                           
 126. Of course, legislators may craft statutory provisions that explicitly create certain 
duties that directors or officers owe to third parties.  In cases involving such provisions, 
courts have to sanction any breaches thereof and analyses of a duty’s internal or external 
nature are superfluous.  However, if statutory provisions are open to judicial interpretation 
as to whether a director or officer is an appropriate defendant and can be liable (or whether 
only the corporation can be liable), courts should carefully analyze the nature of the duty at 
question, focusing on the distinction between internal and external duties. 
 127. But see infra Part IV.A (proposing that, in order to mitigate moral hazard problems, 
directors and officers should remain liable for breaches of internal duties in cases of 
intentional inflictions of harm). 
 128. But see infra Part IV.B (suggesting a model under which personal liability for 
breaches of external duties can only be imposed if there is a showing of at least grossly 
negligent conduct). 
 129. See Frances T. v. Vill. Green Owners Assn., 723 P.2d 573, 581–82 (Cal. 1986) (en 
banc). 
 130. Nevertheless, courts should be mindful of the fact that in the tort context, “duty” 
remains a relatively flexible and policy-driven concept.  See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of 
Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976) (en banc) (“[L]egal duties are not discoverable 
facts of nature, but merely conclusory expressions that, in cases of a particular type, liability 
should be imposed for damage done.”). 
 131. For a similar idea in the context of worker’s compensation, see Steele v. Eaton, 285 
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Examples of indirect harm abound.  For instance, a failure to prevent 
tortious conduct or to detect fraud by an employee or a third party, which is 
a possible breach of the duty to supervise, results in indirect harm.  In 
contrast, it is the employee or the third party’s conduct that will result in 
the direct harm.  Indirect harm can also take the form of misguided 
investment advice, which can result in a possible case of negligent 
management.  In this scenario, it will be market movements or other events, 
and not the misguided advice per se, which will ultimately cause the direct 
monetary harm. 
Internal and external duties can also be distinguished by looking to 
whether the duty in question is one that is owed by an ordinary individual, 
not acting as a corporate agent, to a third party.132  In short, duties that are 
not ordinarily owed to third parties are internal duties and thus cannot be 
the source of personal tortious liability for directors and officers.  For 
example, individuals do not commonly owe third parties a duty to “manage 
carefully.”  In fact, it is difficult to imagine mismanagement claims outside 
of a corporate or business setting.  Thus, the duty to manage is not a duty 
that any individual owes to another party.  Consequently, courts should 
view the duty to manage as a duty that a corporate director or officer owes 
only to the corporation and the exclusive bearer of an external duty to 
manage has to be the corporation. 
The situation is slightly different in the case of the duty to supervise.  For 
example, the Restatement (Second) of Agency specifically states that an 
agent may be liable to third parties based on his negligence in supervising 
other agents appointed by his principal.133  In addition, an individual’s duty 
to supervise is common in various areas of tort law, such as parental or 
medical liability.134  Nevertheless, the duty to supervise arises only in 
                                                           
A.2d 749 (Vt. 1971).  In Steele, an employee who had suffered an injury during an industrial 
accident sought recovery from the corporate president, claiming that  
he was negligent in not providing adequate workplace safety.  Id. at 751–52. The Supreme 
Court of Vermont shielded the corporate president (who was not present at the time of the 
accident) from personal liability, holding that the necessary “immediacy of participation” 
was not present given that other, intermediate, supervisors were on the scene of the accident.  
Id. at 752–53. The court also stressed that there must have been “acts constituting direct 
negligence” toward the plaintiff in order to state a successful claim.  Id. at 751.  The 
“immediacy of participation” or “proximity” test pronounced in Steele was later abolished in 
Garrity v. Manning, 671 A.2d 808, 811 (Vt. 1996). 
 132. For example, a director or officer owes a third party the same duty to exercise due 
care not to injure that party which any individual person owes to another.  The injured party 
may have a tort cause of action for damages against the director or officer if an injury is 
sustained as the result of a breach of the duty which the director or officer as an individual 
owes to the third party.  See Frances T., 723 P.2d at 581 n.12 (citing Saucier v. U.S. Fid. 
and Guar. Co., 280 So. 2d 584, 585–86 (La. App. 1973)). 
 133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 358(1) (1958). 
 134. See, e.g., WILLIAM PROSSER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS 383–85, 914–15 (5th ed. 
1984).  
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situations in which an individual is in a position in which he is legally 
obliged to exercise control over another.135 
In the case of a director or officer, the obligation to exercise control 
arises only within the corporate hierarchy.  Without the corporation, the 
director or officer would not have an obligation to exercise control over 
subordinate employees.  For example, unlike the duty not to expose others 
to unreasonable risks when driving a car, the duty to supervise is not a duty 
that any individual commonly owes.  Accordingly, this is an indication that 
the duty to supervise  
also represents a director or officer’s internal duty.  In sum, both 
supervision and management are not duties commonly imposed upon the 
public at large.  They are duties that individuals acting as corporate 
directors and officers136 would not have absent the existence of the 
corporation.137 
An illustration of the ease with which a court can distinguish between 
internal and external duties is found in Donnelly v. Handy.138  The plaintiffs 
charged a corporate officer, Noble Handy, with negligent supervision and 
management in connection with a suit arising out of various disputes as to 
the quality of workmanship under a contract concerning the construction of 
plaintiffs’ residence.  The court held that the plaintiffs failed to state a 
cause of action against Mr. Handy and found that he did not owe a personal 
                                                           
 135. Id. at 384. 
 136. Directors’ and officers’ roles consist in great part of supervision and management.  
Directors, as part of a corporate board, typically carry out a supervisory or monitoring 
function and engage in certain (at least in larger corporations, high-level) managerial tasks.  
See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK 11–15 (5th ed. 2007) 
(enumerating, broadly, the overall responsibilities of corporate directors); STEPHEN M. 
BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 195 (2002) (explaining that the 
monitoring function remains the board’s chief role).  Officers, on the other hand, are in 
charge of managing the corporation’s daily business as well as exercising certain 
supervisory functions.  See, e.g., THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE:  ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.01 (1994).  In addition, both 
directors and officers have within their scope, a positive duty to implement appropriate 
internal controls to monitor legal compliance and business risks.  See Stone v. Ritter, 911 
A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006), aff’g, No. Civ. A. 1570-N, 2006 WL 302558 (Del. Ch. 2006); In 
re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 964 A.2d 106, 126 (Del. Ch. 2009) 
(explaining that directors may be liable “under some set of facts” for failing to properly 
monitor business risks); see also Miller v. McDonald, 385 B.R. 576, 592 (Bankr. Del. 2008) 
(expanding In re Caremark oversight duties to officers). 
 137. See Frances T. v. Vill. Green Owners Assn., 723 P.2d 573, 582 (Cal. 1986) (“[A] 
broad application of agency principles to corporate decision-makers would not adequately 
distinguish the directors’ duty of care to third persons, which is quite limited, from their 
duty to supervise broad areas of corporate activity.”). 
 138. 415 So. 2d 478 (La. Ct. App. 1982).  Donnelly involved a contract between the 
plaintiffs and the defendant officer’s corporation.  The outcome of the case might therefore 
also be explained as following the principle that contractual claims cannot be brought as tort 
claims.  See supra note 83 and accompanying text.  The court, however, did not limit its 
opinion in such manner and specifically addressed the possibility of a successful tort claim 
against the defendant. Thus, the holding is not limited to claims which arise out of a 
preexisting contractual relationship. 
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duty to the plaintiffs to properly supervise, inspect, govern, control, and 
manage the construction.139  The court found that this was a duty owed by 
the defendant to the corporation exclusively, by virtue of his employment 
relationship, and by the corporation to the plaintiffs, by virtue of their 
contract, but not by the defendant to the plaintiffs.140  Conversely, had the 
plaintiffs alleged that Mr. Handy had negligently damaged their property, 
the court found that they would have  
stated a cause of action.141  However, the court concluded that the 
allegations of negligent supervision were “of a different nature completely” 
and did not establish the breach of a personal duty owed to the plaintiffs.142 
In light of the factors discussed above and in view of supporting case 
law, it becomes apparent that there are good reasons to treat supervision 
and management as internal duties, which the directors and officers owe 
exclusively to the corporation.  As a result, courts should not allow non-
shareholder third parties to bring claims based on supervision and 
management, turning these duties into external duties by using tort law.  
Directors and officers fulfill supervisory and managerial duties,143 but they 
do so within the confines of the corporate framework144 and arguably based 
on the understanding that their duties in this respect only exist vis-à-vis the 
corporation and its shareholders, not third parties.145  Therefore, extending 
the duties to supervise and manage the corporation to outsiders represents a 
troubling and unwarranted augmentation of directors’ and officers’ overall 
duties. 
Courts that apply the rule that corporate agents are not personally liable 
to third persons for negligence amounting merely to a breach of a duty they 
owe to the corporation alone are using a prudent approach.146  However, 
one important reservation remains regarding the practice of certain courts 
that use a duty-based approach.  It should not matter whether there was an 
                                                           
 139. Donnelly, 405 So. 2d at 481–82. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 481. 
 142. Id. at 481–82. 
 143. See Steele v. Eaton, 285 A.2d 749, 752 (Vt. 1971) (holding that the director is only 
liable if he directly participated in the action or omission which caused injury). 
 144. In addition, corporate law provides directors and officers with considerable 
protections from personal liability, whereas ordinary tort law does not provide such 
protections.  See infra Part III.B. 
 145. As an exception, directors of an insolvent corporation may owe fiduciary duties to 
company creditors.  See North Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 
930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del. 2007) (creditors of an insolvent corporation can maintain derivative 
claims against directors for breaches of fiduciary duties); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Much Ado 
About Little? Directors’ Fiduciary Duties in the Vicinity of Insolvency, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 
335, 347 (2006). 
 146. See, e.g., Donnelly, 415 So. 2d at 480 (discussing Louisiana’s preference for the 
“duty analysis” in determining officers’ liability to third parties); Garrity v. Manning, 671 
A.2d 808, 811 (Vt. 1996) (discussing the duty-based approach in the context of worker’s 
compensation and the duty to provide a safe workplace). 
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act or an omission.147  Modern courts have rightly rejected the ancient 
distinction between misfeasance, nonfeasance, and sometimes 
malfeasance.148  The duty to supervise or manage remains an internal duty, 
whether it consists of omissions (such as not having prevented tortious 
conduct) or positive acts (such as taking a decision which leads to harm to 
a third party).  This approach is preferable because there is no obvious 
reason to treat omissions differently than actions. 
2. The corporation as exclusive bearer of duties 
Let us assume, as suggested in the preceding section, that supervision 
and management are purely internal duties, a breach of which cannot lead 
to a director or officer’s personal liability.  Does this mean that a third 
party, injured by inadequate supervision or management by directors or 
officers, does not have any recourse?  No.  Instead, the injured third party 
would have to seek recourse against the corporation instead of directors or 
officers because the corporation alone bears external duties to supervise 
and manage. 
Of course, as we have already seen, courts do not broadly accept the 
view that only the corporation itself owes a duty to third parties to avoid 
harm related to inadequate supervision or management.  In fact, the 
disaccord is deeper and touches upon the fundamental question of how the 
law attributes tort liability to corporations and other legal entities.  In short, 
the issue in the context of corporate torts is whether:  (1) a corporation’s 
liability can only be triggered by a corporate agent’s own tortious conduct 
(exposing the agent to potential individual liability); or (2) whether the 
corporation can be liable despite the absence of any individual corporate 
actors’ tortious conduct, i.e. solely by virtue of the breach of a duty borne 
exclusively by the corporation. 
There is still a widespread conception that since a corporation can only 
act through someone acting on its behalf, there must always be an 
individual who can be made responsible (and held liable together with the 
corporation) for torts in the corporate context.  Fletcher’s Cyclopedia of the 
Law of Private Corporations expresses this sentiment as follows:  “I have 
been injured by a wrong done by the corporation; the corporation can act 
only by officers or agents and hence I should be entitled to recover from 
the officers or agents who are the wrongdoers.”149  Along these lines, courts 
often stress that the only way in which a corporation can act is through the 
                                                           
 147. See supra note 100 (Providing examples of cases that rely on the rule of non-
liability for nonfeasance). 
 148. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 149. 3 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS § 1134 (2008). 
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individuals who act on its behalf and, in turn, conclude that a person 
injured by a wrong done by the corporation will necessarily be entitled to 
recover from directors, officers, or other corporate agents linked to the 
misconduct.150 
However, this view ignores the basic premise of the corporation as a 
separate entity and is contrary to important developments in the law of 
torts.  There are two distinct means by which the law can attribute tort 
liability to a corporation:  directly or vicariously.  In the case of vicarious 
liability, the corporation is simply liable for its agent’s wrongful conduct.  
Conversely, pursuant to the correct interpretation, holding the corporation 
directly liable does not require that there must always be an individual 
liable along with the corporation. 
Courts have solved the problem of how to hold a corporation directly 
liable, independent from tortious conduct by its agents, with the advent of 
“depersonalized” enterprise liability.151  For example, in the early landmark 
                                                           
 150. See, e.g., Garrity, 671 A.2d at 811 (noting that in the context of an employee’s tort 
claim against his supervisor “[a] corporation must act through people . . . .  In all cases, an 
injured worker can identify a person who is responsible to the corporation for discharging 
the particular responsibility the worker claims was breached and sue that person rather than 
the corporation.”). 
 151. In contrast to U.S. law, some civil law countries today still grapple with the concept 
of the corporation as a separate bearer of liability.  See generally Yedidia Z. Stern, 
Corporate Criminal Personal Liability:  Who is The Corporation?, 13 J. CORP. L. 125, 126 
n.4 (1987).  For example, under both German and Swiss law, a corporation can only be 
liable for another’s tortious acts.  Corporate liability comes either in the form of (1) 
vicarious liability, or (2) direct liability.  Vicarious liability typically occurs in cases of 
tortious conduct by lower-level employees.  See Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil 
Code] Aug. 18, 1896, Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBl] 195, as amended, § 831 (Ger.); 
Schweizerisches Obligationenrecht [OR][Code of Obligations] Mar. 30, 1911, SR 220, art. 
55 (Switz.).  Direct liability, however, is still imputed through tortious conduct by 
“managing agents”—such as directors and executive officers—and then treated as the 
corporation’s own conduct.  See Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] Aug. 18, 
1896, Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBl] 195, as amended, § 31 (Ger.); Schweizerisches 
Zivilgesetzbuch [ZGB][Civil Code] Dec. 10, 1907, SR 210, art. 55, ¶ 2 (Switz.).  
Importantly, in both cases, the individual whose conduct is imputed to the corporation 
remains liable along with the corporation, and  
a third party can hold both jointly and severally liable.  See Gert Brüggemeier, 
Unternehmenshaftung – Enterprise Liability:  Eine europäische Perspektive? [Enterprise 
Liability:  A European Perspective?], Haftung und Versicherung 165–66 (2004) (Switz.) 
(German law); Vito Roberto & Martin Petrin, Organisationsverschulden aus zivilrechtlicher 
Sicht [Civil Liability for 3egligent Corporate Organisation], in VERANTWORTLICHKEIT IM 
UNTERNEHMEN:  ZIVIL- UND STRAFRECHTLICHE PERSPEKTIVEN [CORPORATE LIABILITY – 
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LAW PERSPECTIVES] 74 (M.A. Niggli & M. Amstutz, eds., 2007) 
(Swiss law).  Thus, both jurisdictions have not found it possible to hold a corporation (or 
other legal entity) directly liable without, at least as a theoretical matter, finding the 
commission of a separate tort by a corporate agent.  In contrast, under U.S. tort law, the 
distinction between lower-level employees and managing agents of a corporation appears to 
be of relevance in the context of establishing a specific state of mind of a corporate 
defendant.  For example, under California law, one requisite that must be met before a 
plaintiff may recover exemplary damages from a corporate employer is that the necessary 
state of mind must be present on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the 
corporation.  See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(b) (West 2009); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
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products liability decision MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,152 Justice 
Cardozo made the car manufacturer’s individual actors disappear behind 
the corporate shield, treating the corporation as the sole bearer of the duty 
of care to the third party plaintiff.153  Of course, this development is even 
more remarkable in light of the early rule that corporations could not be 
liable for torts, directly or vicariously.154 
The holding in MacPherson does not suggest that we should treat 
liability for supervision and management according to products liability 
principles.  Although, where failures to supervise or manage are the result 
of a collective process, in which plaintiffs cannot identify one or more 
individuals as the wrongdoers, this could be a feasible approach.  Rather, 
MacPherson suggests that the law recognizes that the corporation may be 
directly and exclusively liable, without a director, officer, or other agent 
being liable at the same time.155 
                                                           
OF TORTS § 909 (1979).  Nevertheless, at least in the case of punitive damages awards, there 
is not necessarily a requirement that the evidence establish a particular committee or officer 
of the corporation acted with the necessary state of mind.  See Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 122 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 139, 157, 158 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002), vacated by 123 S. Ct. 2072 (2003), 
remanded to 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 793 (2003);  
see also Ted C. Craig & Christopher N. Johnson, When is a Manager a Managing Agent?, 
75 FLA. B.J. 62 (2001) (discussing corporate liability for punitive damages under Florida 
law). 
 152. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
 153. See id. at 1055.  (“[T]he defendant was not absolved from a duty of inspection . . . . 
[Buick Motor Co.] was a manufacturer of automobiles.  It was responsible for the finished 
product.”).  While McPherson was still based on liability for negligence, the Supreme Court 
of California introduced in 1963 the rule of strict products liability.  See Greenman v. Yuba 
Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963)  
(en banc).  Subsequently, products liability law developed even further, making it possible 
that, under certain circumstances, liability could not only be shown independent of corporate 
agents’ conduct, but also without proof that the defendant producer, manufacturer, or seller 
itself was responsible for a defective product.  Thus, under the theory of market share 
liability, an injured person may hold a defendant liable for damages in proportion to its 
share of the total market for the product. See, e.g., Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 
(Cal. 1988). 
 154. See, e.g., Denver & R. G. Ry. Co. v. Harris, 122 U.S. 597, 608 (1887) (“it is now 
perfectly well settled, contrary to the ancient authorities, that a corporation is liable civiliter 
for all torts committed by its servants or agents by authority of the corporation, express or 
implied.”).  See also THOMAS M. COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS 136–41 (2d ed. 1888) (discussing 
abandonment of the rule that corporations cannot be liable in tort). 
 155. This principle is often overlooked by courts.  See, e.g., Sarvis v. Boston Safe 
Deposit and Trust Co., 711 N.E.2d 911, 920 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999) (opining that a 
corporation’s liability is “necessarily vicarious”).  Many other courts, of course, do 
recognize the possibility of a corporation’s direct liability.  Common examples are a 
corporation’s liability for failure to adequately supervise or train its employees.  See, e.g., 
Far W. Fin. Corp. v. D & S Co., 760 P.2d 399, 402 (Cal. 1988) (en banc) (supervision); De 
Vera v. Long Beach Pub. Transp. Co., 225 Cal. Rptr.789, 794 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) 
(training).  A corporation may also be directly liable for its negligence in instructing, 
selecting, and controlling an independent contractor under sections 410, 411, and 414 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts.  See, e.g., Gass v. V.I. Tel. Corp., 311 F.3d 237, 241 (3d Cir. 
2002); Hinger v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 902 P.2d 1033, 1046 (N.M. Ct. App. 
1995). 
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In other words, agency principles and vicarious liability are not the only 
doctrinal basis through which courts can attribute the actions of directors 
and officers to the corporation.156  Instead, a corporation can be directly 
liable for its own conduct and the breach of duties that it exclusively owes 
to third parties.  To be sure, even in these cases, one or more individuals 
acting for the corporation will carry out the acts that constitute a breach of 
duties of care.  These acts, however, will be “added” to the corporation’s 
duty, resulting together in the corporation’s sole liability. 
Thus, while a corporation may well be a “creature of legal fiction,”157 it 
is not a precise statement of the law to hold that corporations are “incapable 
of tortious conduct” by themselves and that they may only be liable for the 
acts of their agents.158  The law has proven to be amenable to treating the 
corporation as more than just the sum of its individual parts, i.e. its agents, 
but as an aggregate of its individual agents’ acts and their knowledge.159  
As such, the corporation is capable of having its own state of mind, bearing 
its own duties and being held liable in the absence of an independent tort 
by an agent.  In short, the corporation does, indeed, have a separate 
personality.160 
Consequently, in instances where only the corporation owes duties to the 
public at large, but not the directors and officers individually, it is 
appropriate to limit third party liability to the corporation alone.  This is 
precisely the situation courts face when confronted with claims against 
directors and officers for failures in supervision and management.  In these 
instances, courts should not look past the corporate shield and should 
refrain from imposing liability on directors and officers. 
                                                           
 156. Nevertheless, many legal systems, including the United States, believe that 
corporate liability can only be understood through the law of agency.  See Stern, supra note 
151, at 126 (noting, inter alia, that the limitation on corporate rights and duties to fit into the 
substance and rationale of agency law has led to inadequate solutions to the problem of 
corporate liability for torts). 
 157. Lokay v. Lehigh Valley Coop. Farmers, 492 A.2d 405, 408 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). 
 158. Id. at 409. 
 159. See, e.g., Gutter v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours, 124 F. Supp.2d 1291, 1309 (S.D. Fla. 
2000) (en banc) (explaining that the knowledge necessary to adversely affect the corporation 
need not be possessed by a single corporate agent and that the cumulative knowledge of 
several agents can be imputed to the corporation).  See also Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 122 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 139, 158 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002), vacated by 123 S. Ct. 2072 (2003), remanded 
to 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 793 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (“It is difficult to imagine how corporate malice 
could be shown in the case of a large corporation except by piecing together knowledge and 
acts of the corporation’s multitude of managing agents.”). 
 160. See Stern, supra note 151, at 125 (explaining that because a collective body may 
have a legal personality distinct from its individual members and be the independent subject 
of legal rights and duties, “the corporation has been able to replace the individual as the 
principal actor in modern commercial life”). 
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B. Failure to Align Corporate Law and Tort Law Liability Standards 
Corporate law and tort law differ in many ways, most notably in defining 
liability standards for third party claims.  These differences become most 
apparent when examining the general defenses and protections that 
corporate law offers that are not similarly offered under tort law.  For 
instance, in Delaware, the business judgment rule broadly protects 
directors161 and officers162 against liability for business decisions.  Even if 
the business judgment rule does not apply, the applicable standard of care 
is not simple negligence, but gross negligence.163  Moreover, Caremark 
allegations of internal control failures can only be successful if plaintiffs 
can show a conscious abdication of the respective duties.164  Additionally, 
directors’ liability for shareholders’ duty of care claims can be limited or 
wholly excluded by virtue of exculpatory charter provisions.165 
In contrast, none of these corporate law protections apply to tort claims 
brought by third party plaintiffs.  Tort-based suits for supervision and 
management ordinarily operate under a simple negligence standard,166 or, 
in the case of certain strict liability statutory provisions, do not even require 
any wrongdoing at all.  Neither the business judgment rule167 nor—at least 
                                                           
 161. See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000) (“[D]irectors’ 
decisions will be respected by courts unless the directors are interested or lack independence 
relative to the decision, do not act in good faith, act in a manner that cannot be attributed to 
a rational business purpose or reach their decision by a grossly negligent process that 
includes the failure to consider all material facts reasonably available.”); see also Stephen 
M. Bainbrige, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 
88 (2004). 
 162. See In re the Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 47 n.38 (Del. 2006) 
(en banc) (noting that directors and officers are subject to the same fiduciary duties and 
standards of substantive review).  See also Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708–09 (Del. 
2009) (en banc) (clarifying that the fiduciary duties of officers of Delaware corporations are 
the same as those of directors). 
 163. See, e.g., McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 921 (Del. 2000) (“Director liability for 
breaching the duty of care ‘is predicated upon concepts of gross negligence.’”). 
 164. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006) aff’g, No. Civ. A. 1570-N, 
2006 WL 302558 (Del. Ch. 2006) (en banc) (explaining that plaintiffs must demonstrate a 
director’s conscious disregard for his duties as a precondition of oversight liability). 
 165. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2007). 
 166. A minority of courts depart from a simple negligence standard in cases involving 
directors and officers.  See Myers & Chapman, Inc. v. Thomas G. Evans, Inc., 374 S.E.2d 
385, 393–94 (N.C. 1988) (holding that a director must be grossly negligent in order to be 
held personally liable for failure to adequately supervise a subordinate); Preston-Thomas 
Const., Inc. v. Central Leasing Corp., 518 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Okla. Ct. App. 1973) (“The law 
will not permit an officer or director to escape personal responsibility for his corporation’s 
intentional malfeasance by preserving a state of ignorance through a gross or willful neglect 
of duties.”); Inter-Ocean Cas. Co. v. Leccony Smokeless Fuel Co., 17 S.E.2d 51, 53–54 (W. 
Va. 1941) (holding that in the absence of an active intent to deceive or defraud creditors, the 
officers and directors will not be liable for simple nonfeasance of duty to the corporation or 
fraud in its management or mismanagement in the disposition of money or property); Webb 
v. Cash, 250 P. 1, 6 (Wyo. 1926) (holding that state bank directors’ failure to know of 
condition of bank could not make them liable for resulting loss in absence of deliberate or 
reckless conduct). 
 167. See Frances T. v. Vill. Green Owners Assn., 723 P.2d 573, 582 (Cal. 1986)  
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in case of  
direct claims—exculpatory charter provisions168 apply against non-
shareholders. 
For example under corporate law, absent conscious misconduct, 
shareholders could not hold board members and officers liable for their 
failure to detect and prevent employees’ torts.169  Similarly, shareholders 
would most likely not be able to hold directors and officers liable for 
alleged mismanagement under corporate laws, since they would probably 
not be able to overcome the business judgment rule,170 or, because directors 
may be exculpated from liability for duty of care breaches by virtue of 
specific provisions in corporate charters.171  Conversely, in both cases, non-
shareholder tort claimants could be successful in a suit against director and 
officer defendants by demonstrating simple negligence on the part of the 
defendants. 
The unwarranted dichotomy of corporate and tort liability standards has 
gone mostly unnoticed.  A rare exception is Justice Mosk.  In a dissenting 
opinion to a California Supreme Court decision,172 he argued that courts 
should hold directors faced with third-party tort claims to the statutory 
liability standard that governs their internal duties to the corporation, but 
not to the common law standard.173  As Justice Mosk explained, every act 
or omission by directors necessarily affects both the corporation and third 
parties.174  Thus, to hold directors to a higher standard of care insofar as 
their acts or omissions affect third parties, and to a lower standard insofar 
as they affect the corporation, is in effect to hold them to the higher 
                                                           
(en banc) (rejecting the assertion that the business judgment rule controls a director’s 
liability to third persons, as the rule only “applies to parties (particularly shareholders and 
creditors) to whom the directors owe a fiduciary obligation”).  
 168. See Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 794 (Del. Ch. 
2004) (“[exculpatory clauses] only restrict third parties to the extent that they seek to 
enforce rights on behalf of the corporation itself [whereas] . . . [a]ny claims that creditors 
possess[] themselves against the firm or its directors—such as claims for breach of contract 
or for common law or statutory torts . . . [are] not barred by the exculpatory charter 
provision because those claims do not belong to the corporation or its stockholders.”). 
 169. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (en banc) (holding that imposition of 
oversight liability requires a showing that the directors knew that they were not discharging 
their fiduciary obligations), aff’g, No. Civ. A. 1570-N, 2006 WL 302558, at *1–2 (Del. Ch. 
Jan. 26, 2006) 
 170. See, e.g., Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052–53 (Del. Ch. 1996) 
(holding that a derivative claim of corporate losses allegedly sustained by reason of 
mismanagement not resulting from directly conflicting financial interests or improper 
motivation is barred by the business judgment rule). 
 171. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7). 
 172. Frances T., 723 P.2d 573, 591 (Mosk, J., dissenting). 
 173. Id. at 592–99. 
 174. Id. at 598. 
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standard.175  This is because directors will not be free from liability unless 
they adhere to the higher standard.176 
In sum, tort-based claims have the ability to undermine the liability 
protections provided by corporate laws, creating a state of legal uncertainty 
for directors and officers in the process.  Ultimately, the threat of potential 
tort liability for acts or decisions that would pass muster under corporate 
law may undercut directors’ and officers’ decision-making authority.177  As 
a result, courts should attempt to mitigate the awkward misalignment of 
corporate and tort law liability standards.  Directors and officers, when 
faced with tort claims, should not be subject to the ordinary simple 
negligence standard used in general tort law.  Rather, courts should 
measure their liability according to a different, lower liability standard.178 
C. The 3eglect of the Corporate Shield 
Directors’ and officers’ personal liability for torts committed in their 
official capacities raises another important concern.  Allowing plaintiffs to 
hold directors and officers personally and fully liable for supervision and 
management related torts creates a tension in relation to two defining 
corporate law principles.  The first is the principle of a corporation’s 
separate legal personality, which entails that the law recognizes the 
corporation as an entity separate and distinct from its shareholders, 
directors, officers, and other persons who are acting for it.179  The second is 
the principle of limited liability, which restricts shareholders’ personal 
liability for the debts and liabilities of the corporation to the extent of their 
                                                           
 175. Id. 
 176. Id.  Justice Mosk’s dissenting opinion does not refer to the business judgment rule 
and its potential applicability in relation to non-shareholders.  Nevertheless, the majority of 
justices assumed that Justice Mosk in his dissenting opinion also advocated that directors 
should be insulated against third party claims by the business judgment rule.  See id. at 583 
n.15 (characterizing the business judgment rule as a standard of care for corporate directors, 
not as a judicial abstention doctrine). 
 177. In corporate law literature, the problem of striking a balance between a board’s 
authority and its accountability to shareholders has been described as a central aspect of 
corporate law.  The issue also lies at the heart of Professor Bainbridge’s director primacy 
theory.  See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy:  The Means and Ends of 
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 550 (2003). 
 178. See infra Part IV. 
 179. See, e.g., Walker v. Anderson, 232 S.W.3d 899, 918 (Tex. App. 2007); STEPHEN M. 
BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 25–30 (2008) 
(discussing the concept of the corporation as person and other models of the corporation).  
See also Jess M. Krannich, The Corporate “Person”:  A 3ew Analytical Approach to a 
Flawed Method of Constitutional Interpretation, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 61,  
64–90 (2005) (examining the historic use of various corporate metaphors and tracing the 
development of corporate theory); Michael J. Philips, Reappraising the Real Entity Theory 
of the Corporation, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1061, 1063 (1994) (sketching various 
conceptions of the corporation, concluding that a real entity theory of the corporation is 
more plausible than its competitors). 
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investment180 and insulates corporate agents from contractual claims.181  
Together, these principles constitute what I will call the “corporate shield.” 
Imposing personal liability on directors and officers for acts undertaken 
in their corporate capacity, however, undermines both of these principles.  
The current approach of holding directors and officers liable in tort under 
general common law principles or statutory provisions therefore begs the 
question of how it can be reconciled with the notion of the corporate shield. 
1. The corporation as a separate legal personality 
One way of viewing the idea of a corporation’s separate legal personality 
is to treat persons acting on behalf of the corporation as an embodiment of 
the corporation itself, disregarding these persons’ individual personality.  
Thus, only the corporation, not its directors, officers, and other agents—
who have acted only as the corporation’s “arms and legs”—should be liable 
for harm to third parties caused while carrying out their corporate duties.  
The theory of “alter ego” expresses this sentiment.  Under the theory, 
which has traditionally served as a way of justifying vicarious liability, the 
                                                           
 180. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.22(b) (2002).  Limited shareholder liability remains 
a bedrock corporate law principle, even though it has sometimes been contested.  See, e.g., 
Janet Cooper Alexander, Unlimited Shareholder Liability Through a Procedural Lens, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 387, 391 (1992) (characterizing limited liability as a threat to the animating 
principles of tort law); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited 
Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1880 (1991) (arguing that, 
for involuntary creditors, limited liability prevents tort law’s cost allocating function and 
advocating pro rata shareholder liability for corporate torts); David W. Leebron, Limited 
Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors,  
91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1568–69 (1991) (concluding that the case for limited liability has 
been overestimated and that limited liability may be more justified in closely held firms); 
Nina A. Mendelson, A Control-Based Approach to Shareholder Liability for Corporate 
Torts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1203, 1271 (2002) (advocating a regime of vicarious liability for 
corporate torts for shareholders with the capacity to control corporate activity); see also 
Mark I. Weinstein, Don’t Buy Shares Without It:  Limited Liability Comes to American 
Express, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 189 (2008) (examining the effects of adopting limited liability 
on the value of American Express shares, finding little effect on the firm’s value).  For a 
comprehensive overview of various aspects of limited liability, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479 (2001) (analyzing limited liability and its 
justifications); Daniel R. Kahan, Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts:  A Historical 
Perspective, 97 GEO. L.J. 1085, 1088 (2009) (stating the definition and function of limited 
liability); Robert B. Thompson, Unpacking Limited Liability:  Direct and Vicarious 
Liability of Corporate Participants for Torts of the Enterprise, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1994) 
(expanding on how limited liability affects various corporate actors). 
 181. Directors and officers normally enjoy immunity from contractual claims, if they 
were acting in good faith and did not commit independent torts.  See In re JWP Inc. Sec. 
Litig, 928 F. Supp. 1239, 1263 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 22, § 
6.07[2].  The immunity from contractual claims follows the general rule that an agent who 
on behalf of his principal enters into a contract with another is not liable under that contract.  
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 320 (1958).  Note, however, that a contractual 
obligation may create duties the breach of which will support a tort action.  See Michaelis v. 
Benavides, 61 Cal. App. 4th 681, 687 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); Fryar v. Westside Habilitation 
Center, Inc., 479 So. 2d 883, 890  
(La. 1985); Canter v. Koehring Co., 283 So. 2d 716 (La. 1973) (allowing tort law recovery 
against a corporate officer or agent in connection with his corporation’s breach of contract). 
PETRIN_OFF_TO_PRINTER_CORREX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/3/2010  10:45 AM 
2010]THE CURIOUS CASE OF DIRECTORS’ AND OFFICERS’ LIABILITY  1695 
agent is the “alter ego” of his principal.  Therefore, the principal should be 
responsible for any losses caused while the agent was acting on his 
behalf.182 
Greenauer v. Sheridan-Brennan Realty Co.,183 an older New York case, 
illustrates the alter ego approach.184  In that case, a corporation was held 
liable for the death of a third party, caused by an accident on the 
corporation’s premises.185  However, the managing officer of the corporate 
owner who was in charge of repairs, upkeep, and general management of 
the property, was not held personally liable.186  The court explained that the 
officer “acted only for the corporation” and that “his acts were [the 
corporation’s] acts, and not his own; as an individual he had no authority 
whatever . . . .  In that sense only was he its agent.”187  Similarly, there are 
other cases that deviate from the general rule and stand for the proposition 
that corporate officers and other agents are not personally liable where they 
have not acted outside their corporate capacity.188 
Building upon these ideas a director or officer acting for the corporation 
should be treated as the embodiment of the corporation itself, making only 
the latter liable for any misconduct.  An alter ego approach can also be 
useful in cases where the misconduct originates from one or more 
individually identifiable actors.189 
                                                           
 182. See, e.g., JOHN G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 409–10 (9th ed. 1998) (clarifying 
the ideological underpinnings of the employer’s vicarious liability as requiring that “a 
person who employs others to advance his own economic interest should in fairness be 
placed under a corresponding liability for losses incurred in the course of the enterprise”). 
 183. 229 N.Y.S. 719 (N.Y. App. Div. 1928). 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 721. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 722.  Similarly, under UK law, the “organic theory” treats directors and 
officers as the embodiment of the corporation itself.  Thus, the company and the individuals 
acting for it merge into a single legal entity, and the individual’s acts are disattributed from 
the individual and attributed to the company.  See Ross Grantham, Attributing Responsibility 
to Corporate Entities:  A Doctrinal Approach, 19 COMPANIES & SEC. L.J. 168.  The organic 
approach distinguishes between acts of “organs” that are attributed to the corporation and 
acts of mere agents or subordinate corporate employees, which are not attributed to the 
corporation.  See Stern, supra note 151, at 129; see also Yedidia Z. Stern, Corporate 
Liability for Unauthorized Contracts–Unification of the Rules of Corporate Representation, 
9 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 649 (1987). 
 188. See, e.g., Cantwell v. City of Boise, 191 P.3d 205, 216 (Idaho 2008) (“The actions 
of an agent are the actions of the corporation.  An agent is only liable for actions which are 
outside its scope of duty to the corporation.”); Rodriguez v.  
1414–22 Ogden Ave. Realty Corp., 304 A.D.2d 400, 401 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003); supra note 
19. 
 189. In contrast, an aggregate view of the corporation—or products liability-inspired 
approach—would arguably be less helpful in those instances. See supra Part III.A.2. 
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2. Limited liability for directors and officers? 
Corporations are formed with the intent “to protect individual 
shareholders, directors, and officers from [personal] liability.”190  As 
Professors Hansmann and Kraakman have shown, the essential role of a 
legal entity is to provide for “asset partitioning,” which includes the 
corporation’s limited liability feature.191  Today’s rules, however, which 
allow directors and officers to be held fully liable for supervision, 
management, and other conduct deemed tortious, deeply compromise the 
notion of the corporation as a device to limit personal liability.  Contrary to 
the idea of “asset partitioning,” directors’ and officers’ personal liability 
allows tort creditors to go beyond the “designated pool of assets that are 
available to satisfy claims by the firm’s creditors.”192 
This is particularly true in cases where plaintiffs claim that the director 
or officer defendant “should have known” of tortious conduct by 
subordinates,193 or where statutory liability is based solely on a defendant’s 
controlling position within a corporation.194  Both are reminiscent of 
unwarranted vicarious liability for the conduct of others and create de facto 
nondelegable duties for directors and officers.  Specifically, use of the 
responsible corporate officer doctrine is a departure from the usual 
protections provided by the law surrounding directors’ and officers’ tort-
based liability and represents a considerable augmentation of directors’ and 
officers’ liability risks.195 
                                                           
 190. See, e.g., Fine-Cut Diamonds Corp. v. Shetrit, No. 1283/06 2009 WL 264122, at *3 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009). “Organizing a corporation to avoid personal liability is legitimate. 
Indeed, it is one of the primary advantages of doing business in the corporate form.”  
Hanewald v. Bryan’s Inc., 429 N.W.2d 414, 415 (N.D. 1988). 
 191. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational 
Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 390 (2000); see also Henry Hansman, et al., Law and the Rise of 
the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1333 (2006). 
 192. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 191, at 392–93 (describing typical attributes of 
legal entities). 
 193. See, e.g., Avery v. Solargizer Int’l, Inc., 427 N.W.2d 675, 681 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1988) (indicating that a director or officer may be found personally liable for negligently 
failing to prevent the tortious conduct of an employee); Preston-Thomas Constr., Inc. v. 
Cent. Leasing Corp., 518 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Okla. Civ. App. 1973) (holding that a director or 
officer will be personally liable for tortious conduct if there is either a duty to know or the 
means to know, regardless of actual knowledge). 
 194. See supra Parts I.D and II.B. 
 195. See Tom McMahon & Katie Moertl, The Erosion of Traditional Corporate Law 
Doctrines in Environmental Cases, 3 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 29, 29–31 (1988) 
(enumerating specific cases pointing toward an expansion of director and officer liability for 
corporate activity); Mendelson, supra note 180, at 1265 (noting that cases under CERCLA 
have been perceived to be eroding limited liability and other traditional corporate law 
concepts); but cf. Lynda J. Oswald & Cindy A. Schipani, CERCLA and the “Erosion” of 
Traditional Corporate Law Doctrine, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 259, 329–30 (1992) (concluding 
that contrary to fears expressed by many commentators, courts have not dismissed general 
principles of corporate law doctrine in  
deciding cases against corporate actors for CERCLA violations).  In addition, one 
commentator has pointed out that liability under the responsible corporate officer doctrine 
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The fundamental issue is whether the principle of limited liability can be 
extended to directors and officers in a manner that would protect them from 
tort claims as long as they acted within their scope of employment.  In its 
current form, limited liability does not preclude directors’ and officers’ 
personal liability for their torts and tort-like statutory violations.196  Today, 
at least in this respect, tort law trumps corporate law as well as the notions 
of the corporation’s separate personality and limited liability.  Thus, for 
directors and officers, protection under the corporate shield is limited to 
contractual claims.197  Why does the law allow for this distinction? 
Courts and commentators sometimes explain the narrow protections 
provided to directors and officers by distinguishing between voluntary 
contractual creditors and involuntary tort creditors.  Arguably, involuntary 
tort creditors deserve the right to seek recovery from both the corporation 
and the individual (but not from the shareholders, who are normally 
protected even against claims by involuntary creditors),198 because a tort 
case forces the debtor creditor relationship upon the creditor and there is no 
element of choice involved.199  In justifying the doctrine of a corporate 
                                                           
may not be covered by typical D&O liability insurance policies.  See Kevin LaCroix, The 
Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine, D&O DIARY, Jan. 19, 2009, 
http://www.dandodiary.com/2009/01/articles/environmental-liability/the-responsible-
corporate-officer-doctrine.  
 196. See, e.g., Frances T. v. Vill. Green Owners Ass’n, 723 P.2d 573, 582–83 (Cal. 
1986) (en banc) (noting that the corporate fiction was “never intended to insulate officers 
from liability for their own tortious conduct”); Thompson, supra note 180,  
at 7. 
 197. See Thompson, supra note 180, at 7.  One possible, but narrow, exception to the 
principle that the corporate shield insulates corporate actors only from contractual claims 
may be provided by the judicially created fiduciary shield doctrine.  The doctrine, if applied 
by courts, precludes the exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident corporate agents 
or employees who are acting in the forum state in their role as corporate agents or 
employees.  See, e.g., Giusto v. Ashland Chem. Co., 994 F. Supp. 587, 590 (E.D. Pa. 1998) 
(mem.).  Other courts, however, refuse to recognize the doctrine and subject the corporate 
official to suits for tortious conduct committed in his corporate capacity.  See, e.g., Kreutter 
v. McFadden Oil Corp., 522 N.E.2d 40, 46 (N.Y. 1988). 
 198. See Thompson, supra note 180, at 12–17.  Note, however, that shareholders are not 
shielded from personal liability for their own tortious acts.  See, e.g., Smith v. Isaacs, 777 
S.W.2d 912, 913–14 (Ky. 1989) (noting that a corporate agent is liable for the damage 
caused by his own personal acts).  Specifically, a shareholder may also be held personally 
liable for negligent acts in managing and supervising the employees of its corporation, if 
those acts are a contributing factor in causing an injury. See id.  
at 914. 
 199. See Ross Grantham, The Limited Liability Of Company Directors 27–28 (University 
of Queensland, TC Beirne School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research 
Paper No. 07-03, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=991248;  
see also Axtmann v. Chillemi, 740 N.W.2d 838, 843–44 (N.D. 2007) (discussing the 
distinction in the context of veil piercing).  The Supreme Court of California has also used 
the distinction between voluntary and involuntary creditors as an explanation for why the 
business judgment rule does not apply to non-shareholders.  See Frances T. 723 P.2d at 
582–83 n.14 (“Of course, a tort victim cares little whether the tortfeasor acted in good faith 
to maximize the interests of the enterprise. Unlike shareholders challenging an unprofitable 
decision, a tort victim’s exposure to the risk of harm is generally involuntary and 
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agent’s personal liability for his torts, courts and commentators have also 
emphasized their unwillingness to allow the corporate agent to hide behind 
the corporate veil, as this would encourage irresponsible behavior and 
result in unfair outcomes.200 
Moreover, some observers have even advocated for significant increases 
in the personal liability of corporate officials.201  In a recent article, 
Professor Timothy Glynn suggested a system where the highest-ranking 
corporate official is vicariously liable for all torts and tort-like statutory 
violations committed within the corporate enterprise.202  Glynn asserts that 
the model preserves the beneficial effects of limited shareholder liability 
while also reducing the social costs of limited liability by counteracting its 
“moral hazard” problem.203  Under the model, in order to escape personal 
liability, the highest-ranking “officers will seek to avoid risk and spread the 
cost of unavoided risk across firm participants.”204  For example, the risk-
spreading can consist of:  setting appropriate prices for the firm’s goods 
and services; monitoring firm activities; maintaining an adequate level of 
                                                           
uncompensated.  And unlike the review of business judgments that affect only the pecuniary 
interests of investors, courts have a long and distinguished record of deciding whether a 
defendant’s personal conduct imposed an unreasonable risk of injury on the plaintiff.”). 
 200. See, e.g., Grynberg Prod. Corp. v. British Gas, P.L.C., 817 F. Supp. 1338,  
1350–51 (E.D. Tex. 1993) (mem.); Frances T., 723 P.2d at 581 (“[A] director could inflict 
injuries upon others and then escape liability behind the shield of his or her representative 
character, even though the corporation might be insolvent or irresponsible.”); Zipora Cohen, 
Directors’ 3egligence Liability to Creditors:  A Comparative and Critical View, 26 J. CORP. 
L. 351, 361 (2001) (arguing that the imposition of tort liability on directors serves justice 
and fairness objectives). 
 201. See Glynn, supra note 66, at 396–415; Paul Halpern et al., An Economic Analysis of 
Limited Liability in Corporation Law, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 117, 148–49 (1980) (suggesting 
that directors of publicly traded corporations should be vicariously liable for 
misrepresentations as to the legal and financial status of the company and in cases of claims 
by involuntary creditors, as “such a rule would minimize the information costs that owners 
would face in monitoring each other’s wealth, would reduce creditors’ transaction costs in 
enforcing claims, and would focus incentives to adopt cost-justified avoidance precautions 
on that body of persons”); see also Thompson, supra note 180, at 27–28, 40–41 (explaining 
that liability for shareholder-managers can be extended if appropriate consideration is given 
to possible over-deterrence).  Professor Kraakman has also suggested that managerial 
liability for debts of the company may be useful in certain contexts, namely in order to 
improve compliance.  See Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the 
Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984).  In a later article, however, he and 
Professor Hansmann dismiss the idea of holding directors or controlling officers vicariously 
liable on efficiency grounds.  See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 180, at 1928–29.  
Hansmann and Kraakman conclude that where insurance is unavailable, “imposing personal 
liability for the firm’s entire tort losses on its managers would create a powerful incentive to 
overinvest in safety measures or, what is more likely, to resign.”  Id. at 1929. 
 202. Glynn, supra note 66, at 396–415.  By “highest-ranking officer,” Glynn refers to a 
firm’s highest-named officer (for example the CEO or corporate president) or any other 
officer who exercises ultimate executive authority over certain firm activities (for example a 
CFO or division head) at the time the tortious activity occurs.  See id. at 397.  Directors 
acting only in their oversight and decision-making capacities and lower-level managers or 
employees would not be included in the proposed liability regime.  Id. 
 203. Id. at 398–400. 
 204. Id. at 400. 
PETRIN_OFF_TO_PRINTER_CORREX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/3/2010  10:45 AM 
2010]THE CURIOUS CASE OF DIRECTORS’ AND OFFICERS’ LIABILITY  1699 
retained capital; having indemnification agreements with the firm or its 
shareholders and; obtaining additional compensation and insurance 
coverage.205  Thus, Glynn bases his model on the idea that the highest-
ranking officer is an “initial risk bear[er]” who passes on any liability to 
other, “ultimate” loss bearers.206 
However, in view of the host of problems associated with directors’ and 
officers’ personal liability discussed in Part IV, it is difficult to justify 
holding directors, officers, or other corporate agents personally liable for 
their own tortious acts committed in the scope of employment, let alone 
holding them liable for torts committed by other corporate agents.  In fact, 
a variety of factors all support limitations on personal liability including:  
the distinction between internal and external duties, the existence of the 
corporation as a separate legal entity, the idea of aligning corporate and tort 
law liability standards, the notion of directors and officers as the 
corporation’s alter ego, and the need to attribute the risk of doing business 
to the corporation. 
Returning for the moment to Professor Glynn’s model, it is hard to 
legitimize why, as a default rule, a liability regime should force an officer 
to risk all of his personal assets and expose him to unlimited liability for 
corporate torts.207  As a practical matter, even if the officer is able to spread 
the cost for compensating tort victims to the corporation, shareholders, or 
an insurer, he can still be a defendant in one or multiple lawsuits against 
him personally potentially for years to come, even after having left the 
firm.  Worse still, under the model, the officer bears the full risk of the 
insolvency (or unwillingness to pay) of those who have agreed to 
indemnify or insure him.208  Hence, in most cases, it is preferable to 
allocate the initial liability risk to the corporation, alleviating the officer of 
potentially harsh consequences and leaving it up to internal corporate 
mechanisms to prevent or reduce corporate torts and misconduct by 
employees. 
Moreover, one commentator has recently made a convincing case that 
the economic justifications for limited liability for shareholders apply by 
analogy with equal force to directors.209  For the most part, scholars think 
of limited shareholders’ liability to be economically efficient.  By reducing 
                                                           
 205. Id. at 401, 404. 
 206. Id. at 403–04. 
 207. Glynn admits that high-ranking officers, under his model, may face significant 
personal liability.  He contends, however, that this residual risk does not render the model 
inefficient and points to high-ranking officers’ superior ability to reduce and spread risks.  
Id. at 404–05.  
 208. See JAMES A. FANTO, DIRECTORS’ AND OFFICERS’ LIABILITY § 8:4.1 (2d ed., Release 
No. 4, Oct. 2009) (discussing problems in indemnification coverage).  See also infra Part 
IV.C (discussing the shortcomings of indemnification and D&O insurance). 
 209. See Grantham, supra note 199. 
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the risk for shareholders, the aggregation of capital is facilitated, thereby 
encouraging investments in risky,  
but lucrative ventures.210  In addition, limited liability reduces shareholders’ 
need to and costs of monitoring their investment or investment 
portfolios.211 
By analogy, these reasons also apply to directors and officers.  Providing 
directors and officers with limited liability facilitates the aggregation of 
“human capital” by helping to recruit well-qualified directors and officers.  
It also encourages them to invest in riskier, but lucrative projects, and leads 
to reduced monitoring costs for shareholders.212  Consequently, limited 
liability considerations should apply to directors and officers as well and 
should represent an additional element in the analysis of the rules 
governing directors’ and officers’ tort liability.213 
The case for extending limited liability to directors and officers is, from 
an efficiency standpoint, also supported by an economic analysis of 
vicarious tort liability.  Law and economics theory suggests that in many 
cases it is inefficient to attribute tort liability to the agent and that instead 
the principal should bear the liability costs arising out of torts committed in 
the scope of the agent’s employment.214  Scholars have argued that a 
system of exclusive liability for the principal,215 such as a corporation, 
                                                           
 210. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 97 (1985) (explaining that “increased availability of funds for 
projects with positive net values is the real benefit of limited liability”). 
 211. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 425 (7th ed. 2007); 
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 208, at 94–98 (1985).  Paul Halpern and his co-authors 
find that a limited liability regime is most efficient in cases of large, widely held companies, 
whereas they argue that liability should extend to shareholders in closely held companies.  
Halpern et al., supra note 201, at 148–49; see also Glynn, supra note 66, at 369–76 
(outlining potential social costs of limited liability, casting doubt upon the doctrine’s 
efficiency). 
 212. See Grantham, supra note 199, at 19–22. 
 213. To be sure, the basic theoretical framework that informs contemporary American 
tort law is already concerned with the foreseeable risks and benefits associated with 
conduct.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM 
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001) § 3 cmt. e (discussing the “risk-benefit test” for negligence).  
Yet, in the corporate context, these considerations do not necessarily result in the provision 
of adequate protections for directors and officers. Moreover, in the case of the breach of 
internal duties, see supra Part III.A, the risk-benefit balancing approach should be addressed 
at the level of the corporation as the potential tortfeasor, since directors and officers owe no 
duty to third parties in such cases and the issue of negligence on their part should not have 
to be considered at all. 
 214. See generally Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice Between 
Enterprise and Personal Liability for Accidents, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1345 (1982) (examining 
shifting costs between enterprise, agent, and victim); Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of 
Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231 (1984) (exploring the efficiency rationale of 
vicarious liability). 
 215. Even though classic vicarious liability results in joint and several liability of the 
principal and the agent, law and economics scholars normally base their analysis on the 
assumption that a vicarious liability regime in fact results in the exclusive liability of the 
principal.  See Arlen & Carney, supra note 15, at 704 (identifying the methodology as 
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enhances loss prevention, helps to internalize costs, and facilitates efficient 
risk allocation.216 
The classic loss-prevention argument is that an agent may not be in a 
position to fully compensate a third party for harm caused by his tortious 
acts.  Thus, an agent will not likely use the optimal amount of care because 
he may be under deterred (because his lack of solvency prevents him from 
having to compensate the injured party in full) or over deterred (because 
his personal wealth may be wiped out in case of a judgment against him.)217  
In any case, it is necessary to make the principal liable for the agent’s torts, 
in order to induce the principal—who is thought to be able to fully 
compensate the tort victims—to make sure the agent uses the amount of 
care and preventive measures that are commensurate to the potential 
harm.218 
Law and economics theory also suggests that, in order to achieve an 
optimal volume of production, goods and services have to reflect their true 
cost to society.219  Thus, prices of goods and services should also 
internalize the liability risks associated with their production.220  However, 
cost internalization can only be achieved if the corporation is liable for the 
torts of its agents.221  Otherwise, such cost could be externalized.222  Even if 
we assume that, in the absence of its own liability, the corporation would 
indemnify its agent for any costs incurred by him, the amounts paid would 
be lower than the full cost of damages if the agent is not solvent enough to 
provide full compensation to the tort victim.223 
                                                           
commonly used by enterprise liability scholars). 
 216. See infra notes 217–227 and accompanying text. 
 217. See Alan O. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability:  An Economic Analysis 
of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 567 
n.9 (1988). 
 218. Under these circumstances, the investments in loss-prevention will be equal to the 
amount of potential damages, which is efficient.  See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 211, at 188; 
STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 233 (2004); Jennifer H. 
Arlen & Bentley W. Mcleod, Beyond Master-Servant:  A Critique of Vicarious Liability, in 
EXPLORING TORT LAW 111–40 (M. Stuart Madden, ed., 2005) (arguing that the scope of 
vicarious liability should be extended); Kornhauser, supra note 214, at 1362; Sykes, supra 
note 214, at 1246.  The loss-prevention case is probably weaker when we deal with directors 
and officers as agents since the corporation arguably cannot exercise the same degree of 
control over them as it could in the case of lower-level employees. 
 219. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of 
Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 505 (1961) (“[T]he most desirable system of loss distribution under 
a strict resource-allocation theory is one in which the prices of goods accurately reflect their 
full cost to society.”). 
 220. See id. at 509 (explaining that economic efficiency requires producers of goods or 
services to weigh potential liability against potential profit in determining the quantity and 
price of goods or services produced). 
 221. See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 172–73 (1987). 
 222. See id. 
 223. See Sykes, supra note 217, at 567. 
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The principle of loss distribution provides another reason why tort law 
should allocate liability only to the principal, but not to the agent.224  
Utilitarian and economic theory contend that the corporation, not its agents, 
are the most appropriate and efficient bearers of liability risks.225  A 
corporation can distribute liability costs more efficiently than an individual 
agent can, as it is in a position to distribute the burden among its 
shareholders, employees, and customers.226  In addition, the corporation 
will be able to insure its liability risks at a cheaper rate than its agents in 
their individual capacities.227 
In sum, efficiency considerations support the extension of limited 
liability to directors’ and officers’ liability for torts.  These reasons seem 
particularly convincing in the context of their liability for supervision and 
management.  The potential damages to third parties in this area can 
amount to large sums and directors and officers (who may well be wealthy 
individuals) represent an attractive target for plaintiffs.  A heightened real 
or perceived liability exposure, however, adds to an inefficiently high level 
of risk aversion on the part of the directors and officers.  In case of their 
actual liability, the additional, unfortunate effects of unlimited liability 
could potentially include a lack of cost internalization on the part of the 
corporation and attribution of liability to inefficient risk bearers. 
D. Misalignment of Costs and Benefits 
Finally, holding directors and officers liable for supervision and 
management failures touches upon the problem of the alignment of costs 
(or risks) and benefits.  Personal liability for acts undertaken in the official 
role as director or officer, which consist in great part of supervision and 
management, shifts the risk of doing business away from the corporation to 
the directors and officers.  As a result, an insolvent or otherwise judgment-
                                                           
 224. See P. S. ATIYAH, VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN THE LAW OF TORTS 27 (1967).  The 
potential benefits of loss-distribution are generally undisputed. In contrast, however, 
commentators have expressed doubts as to whether vicarious liability is actually capable of 
enhancing internalization of costs and loss-prevention.  See id. at 25, 27; Gary T. Schwartz, 
The Hidden and Fundamental Issue of Employer Vicarious Liability,  
69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1739, 1756 (1996). 
 225. For the utilitarian perspective, see ATIYAH, supra note 224, at 22 (arguing that 
unlike the majority of the population, employers were well situated to pay for tort damages); 
Young B. Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 444, 456–63 (1923) (contending 
that distributing losses that are part of the course of industry is more socially expedient than 
passing off the loss to a few); Harold Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 
105, 112 (1916) (emphasizing vicarious liability as the best social distribution of profit and 
loss). For a discussion of loss distribution from an efficiency standpoint, see Fruit v. 
Schreiner, 502 P.2d 133, 141 (Ala. 1972).  
 226. See Sykes, supra note 214, at 1235–36. 
 227. ATIYAH, supra note 224, at 25–26. 
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proof corporation can potentially externalize some of its liability costs to its 
agents. 
The problem of cost internalization has, as already discussed, received 
considerable attention in the context of law and economics analysis.228  
However, the idea of cost benefit alignment has also long been a fixture in 
traditional vicarious liability theory where it serves as probably the most 
universal justification of why a principal should be liable for the acts of his 
agents.  Under this approach, the principal bears the risks related to doing 
business and by dividing labor by utilizing agents.229  As Judge Friendly 
explained in Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States,230 an enterprise 
should not only bear the benefit, but also the typical costs flowing from its 
activities.231 
This idea can be expanded upon by finding that it is the corporation 
alone—but not the agent, director or officer who is acting in furtherance of 
the corporation’s business—that should bear the liability or risk of doing 
business.  Under this rationale, the corporation should always bear the full 
cost of its business, and costs should not be shifted towards individuals by 
making them personally liable for their acts undertaken as agents of the 
corporation. 
In one narrow area of the law, the idea of curbing the liability exposure 
of directors and officers acting for the benefit of their corporations has 
already manifested itself.  Courts have developed the defense of “economic 
justification” to shield directors and officers from claims alleging liability 
for tortious interference with another’s contract.232  In the absence of 
malice or illegality, the defense immunizes these corporate actors from 
claims of tortious interference as long as they act in the interest of or for the 
economic benefit of the company.233 
Applied to supervision and management claims, courts could employ the 
theory of “economic justification” to shield directors and officers from 
                                                           
 228. See supra Part III.C.2. 
 229. See Petro-Tech, Inc. v. W. Co. of N. Am., 824 F.2d 1349, 1358 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(explaining the theory of respondeat superior as under section 219 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Agency by stating that “it would be unjust to permit an employer to gain from 
the intelligent cooperation of others without being responsible for the mistakes, the errors of 
judgment and the frailties of those working under his direction and for his benefit”);  see 
also Gregory C. Keating,  
The Idea of Fairness in the Law of Enterprise Liability, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1266, 1329 
(1997). 
 230. 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 231. Id. at 171. 
 232. See Foster v. Churchill, 665 N.E.2d 153, 156–57 (N.Y. 1996). 
 233. Id. at 157–58.  See also 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney, 538 So. 2d 228, 232 (La. 
1989) (recognizing immunity for negligent contractual interference and even intentional 
interference when acting for the corporation’s benefit); Wampler v. Palmerton, 439 P.2d 
601, 607 (Or. 1968) (declining to extend liability for interference with contract where the 
defendants acted to benefit the corporation). 
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personal liability.  Supervisory and managerial duties are almost always 
carried out in the interests of the corporation and any third-party claims 
flowing from harm caused by supervisory or managerial acts could be 
defended on the grounds of economic justification.  Moreover, tortious 
interference with contractual claims and claims alleging failures in 
supervision and management share some key characteristics.  Both 
typically involve allegations that certain acts within the corporation led to 
the plaintiff’s harm.  Both scenarios normally involve purely indirect harm 
to the injured party and both include acts representing duties that the actor 
owed solely to the corporation.  Thus, the parallels between these two sets 
of claims suggest that the defense of economic justification may be equally 
apt for claims related to supervision and monitoring. 
IV. THE EMERGING MODEL 
Given that a duty-based inquiry into assessing directors’ and officers’ 
liability in tort for supervision and management offers a superior approach 
than other methods of ascertaining liability, and in light of the problems 
associated with holding directors and officers liable for supervision and 
management failures, the current approaches to assessing directors’ and 
officers’ liability toward third parties should be revised.  This Part details a 
proposal to reform the current rules for holding directors and officers liable 
in tort.  In short, the proposed model advocates that directors’ and officers’ 
tort liability should be limited by distinguishing between internal and 
external duties and by using strict requirements with regards to the state of 
mind necessary to hold directors and officers liable.  Finally, the last 
section of this Part will address the model’s potential shortcomings. 
A. Liability for Intentional Breaches of Internal Duties 
Under the proposed model, directors and officers would not be liable for 
breaches of internal duties owed exclusively to the corporation.234  Chief 
among these internal duties are the duties that directors and officers owe to 
the corporation in the context of supervision and management.235  Thus, 
liability for the breach of an internal duty will normally fall only on the 
                                                           
 234. This is an approach already adhered to by certain courts.  See, e.g., Donnelly v. 
Handy, 415 So. 2d 478, 480 (La. Ct. App. 1982). 
 235. See supra Part III.A.1.  In accordance with the modern rule, in defining whether a 
duty is internal or external, no distinction should be made between a director’s or officer’s 
acts and omissions.  See supra note 38 and accompanying text.  However, the scope of the 
duty owed to the corporation can vary depending  
on whether the defendant is an inside or outside director.  See supra note 77.  Specifically, 
courts should take into account that there can be information asymmetries between inside 
and outside directors. 
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corporation through its own direct liability, but not on the individuals who 
were entrusted with supervisory or management tasks. 
Failing to impose liability on directors and officers for breach of internal 
duties is justified, in part, by the fundamental tort law principle that 
“without duty, there is no liability.”236  Moreover, directors and officers 
discharge their supervisory and managerial tasks within the corporate 
framework, which offers them considerable protections or even insulates 
them from liability.  These added protections should be extended to tort-
based claims. 
The idea of limiting liability for breach of internal duty is also buttressed 
by the notion of the corporate shield, which, as explored above, can be 
extended to protect directors and officers from tort liability.237  Moreover, 
holding directors and officers liable for supervision and management 
failures goes against efforts to align the costs and benefits of corporate 
activity.  Directors and officers act for the benefit of the corporation and its 
shareholders.  Consequently, the corporation (and, thus, ultimately the 
shareholders) should bear the liability risks associated with the conduct of 
corporate agents.238 
Nonetheless, excluding personal liability for directors and officers for 
their breaches of internal duties can raise issues of moral hazard.239  
Relieved of personal liability risks, directors and officers may increasingly 
engage in misconduct.  To mitigate moral hazard problems, directors and 
officers should continue to remain liable for the intentional infliction of 
harm and fraudulent conduct, even if such harm is the result of the breach 
of an internal duty.240  Thus, a third party would still be able to sue 
                                                           
 236. Robillard v. Asahi Chem. Indus. Co., 695 A.2d 1087, 1094 (Conn. Super.  
Ct. 1995). 
 237. See supra Part III.C. 
 238. See supra Part III.D. 
 239. The problem has often been discussed in the context of insurance which can create 
“moral hazard” by reducing an insured party’s incentives to avoid risks which are covered 
by its insurance.  See, e.g., KENNETH J. ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 
212–19 (1971); George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 
YALE L.J. 1521, 1547 (1987). 
 240. Some courts have already expressed the idea of holding directors and officers liable 
only for intentional or willful conduct.  See, e.g., Inter-Ocean Cas. Co. v. Leccony 
Smokeless Fuel Co., 17 S.E.2d 51, 53–54 (W. Va. 1941) (holding that officers and directors 
will not be liable for simple nonfeasance of a duty to the corporation or mismanagement in 
the absence of an active intent to deceive or defraud creditors); Webb v. Cash, 250 P. 1, 6 
(Wyo. 1926) (providing that state bank directors are not liable for failure to know of the 
critical condition of their bank in absence of deliberate or reckless conduct).  Other courts 
have advocated that liability should be contingent on at least a showing of gross negligence.  
See Myers & Chapman, Inc. v. Thomas G. Evans, Inc., 374 S.E.2d 385, 393–94 (N.C. 1988) 
(arguing that a director must be grossly negligent in order to be held personally liable for 
failure to adequately supervise a subordinate); Preston-Thomas Constr., Inc. v. Cent. 
Leasing Corp., 518 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Okla. Civ. App. 1973) (“The law will not permit an 
officer or director to escape personal responsibility for his corporation’s intentional 
malfeasance by preserving a state of ignorance through a gross or willful neglect of 
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directors and officers where, for example, the latter either consciously 
failed to prevent torts by employees or is guilty of intentional acts of 
mismanagement.  In addition, the corporation, if held liable, will be able to 
take recourse against the director or officer, but only insofar as his 
conduct—which caused the corporation to incur liability—constituted an 
intentional tort.241 
This deviation from an effort to limit personal liability is justified 
because, apart from moral hazard considerations, directors and officers, 
like any other person,242 remain under a duty not to commit intentional 
torts.  Under obligations imposed by corporate law, directors and officers 
are also not relieved from liability for consciously engaging in illegal 
conduct or otherwise acting in bad faith.243  Thus, the alignment of 
corporate and tort law standards is not disturbed by this exception.  
Moreover, intentional misconduct can be easily and inexpensively 
prevented by the potential defendants themselves, simply by refraining 
from such misconduct. 
B. Liability for Grossly 3egligent Breaches of External Duties 
In addition to limiting the personal liability of directors and officers for 
supervision, management, and other potential breaches of their internal 
duties, a number of grounds explored in this Article also support limiting 
directors’ and officers’ tort liability for breaches of external duties.  
Granted, agency law does not normally provide any protections to an agent 
who breaches a duty owed to third parties, despite the fact that he acted for 
the benefit of and under the directions of someone else.244  However, the 
traditional concepts of alter ego, where a director or officer can be treated 
as the embodiment of the corporation, and alignment of costs and benefits, 
                                                           
duties.”).  Of course, a persuasive argument can be made that intentional harm will render 
any underlying duty into an external duty, i.e., that there is no such thing as an intentional 
breach of internal duties. 
 241. In general, and absent statutory or contractual provisions which hold otherwise, 
principals are entitled to be indemnified by their agents to the extent that the principal is 
required to pay damages owing to acts within the scope of the agent’s employment. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 401 cmt. d (1958); see, e.g., Wilshire Oil Co. of Tex. 
v. Riffe, 409 F.2d 1277, 1283–84 (10th Cir. 1969) (holding that officers could be liable to 
their former corporate employer for expenses and judgments incurred by the corporation if 
the expense was a result of their individual wrongdoing). 
 242. See Blystra v. Fiber Tech Group, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 2d 636, 647 (D.N.J. 2005) 
(equating the duty of directors and officers to the duty of every person to avoid committing 
intentional torts). 
 243. See generally Leo E. Strine et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand:  The Defining Role of 
Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629 (2010) (examining the role of good faith 
in corporate law and, specifically, in the director liability framework). 
 244. See supra note 17. However, there are cases that stand for the proposition that 
directors and officers should not be liable for simple negligence, see supra note 240, or that 
a corporate agent cannot be held liable for torts committed in the scope of his employment, 
see supra note 19. 
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where the corporation is to bear the profits and losses of its business, both 
support limiting directors’ and officers’ liability even in  
cases of breaches of external duties.  Moreover, economic analysis  
of traditional vicarious liability theory also suggests that—notwithstanding 
any distinction between the nature of the duties in question—holding only 
the corporation liable, can, in many instances, result in efficiency gains 
when compared to a regime of individual liability.245 
Taken together, these traditional concepts and economic theory tend to 
justify limiting directors’ and officers’ liability even when they owe a 
personal duty to the injured party.  In addition, while this Article’s focus is 
on directors and officers, it also appears that the considerations that support 
added protections from personal tort liability could be further extended to 
other corporate agents, such as non-managerial employees.  These agents, 
like directors and officers, are an embodiment of their principal, the 
corporation.  Thus, in principle, only the corporation should bear the 
liability costs arising out of the activities its agents undertake on its behalf.  
Indeed, the idea of shielding corporate agents from personal liability for 
breaches of external duties is not utopian, as demonstrated by such rules in 
certain foreign jurisdictions.246 
Nevertheless, this Article will not go so far as to suggest that directors’ 
and officers’ tort liability for breaches of external duties should be 
completely abolished or limited to intentional conduct.  The breach of an 
external duty is different from the breach of an internal duty and, 
accordingly, their treatment should not be equivalent.  External duty 
breaches normally involve the infliction of direct harm, which results from 
the breach of a duty that the defendant personally owed to the injured 
party.247  It is therefore not justified to shield directors and officers from 
third-party liability for breaches of external duties to the same degree as for 
breaches of internal duties.  In addition, as already discussed in the context 
                                                           
 245. See supra Part III.C.2. 
 246. For example, under the law of some Scandinavian countries, liability for torts 
committed by employees is “channeled” to the principal and plaintiffs can only sue the 
latter, but not the employees personally.  See Christian von Bar, et al., Vicarious Liability, in 
TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE 431, 436 n.29 (2d ed. 1998) (identifying Denmark, 
Finland, and Sweden as countries that follow this model).  Also, other countries, such as 
France and the Netherlands, have rules in place which shield corporate agents from personal 
liability for torts in the absence of at least gross negligence.  See, Cass. ass. plén. [highest 
court of ordinary jurisdiction], Feb. 25 2000, J.C.P. 2000, II, 10295, rapport Kessous, note 
Billiau, D. 2000 (Fr.); BW 6:170 para. 3 (Neth.).  In addition, the Dutch Supreme Court has 
recently held that a corporate director will only be liable in tort if he made a sufficiently 
“serious mistake.”  See Bastiaan F. Assink, Secondary Director Liability, THE DEFINING 
TENSION,  
February 12, 2009, http://www.thedefiningtension.com/2009/02/no7-secondary-director-
liability.html. 
 247. See supra Part III.A.1. 
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of internal duties, any liability regime for breaches of external duties has to 
factor in possible moral hazard problems. 
Consequently, in an effort to balance the need to limit liability for 
breaches of external duties against moral hazard considerations and 
traditional rules of tort and agency law, courts should apply a lower 
liability standard to tort cases involving directors and officers.  Hence, the 
proposed model suggests that directors and officers should only be liable 
for breaches of external duties that involve at least gross negligence.248  In 
cases involving only simple negligence by directors and officers, the third 
party may still seek recourse against the corporation, whose vicarious 
liability for its agents’ negligence would remain unchanged.249  This 
approach increases existing protections provided to directors and officers 
while, at the same time, preserving strong personal motivations to act 
carefully when engaged in actions which may cause direct harm to third 
parties. 
C. Limitations 
The proposed liability model appears to be vulnerable to two main 
criticisms.  First, restricting directors and officers liability to instances of 
intentional conduct (for internal duties) and grossly negligent conduct (for 
external duties) may take away important incentives to act in a responsible 
manner.250  Second, critics could argue that limiting directors’ and officers’ 
liability vis-à-vis involuntary tort creditors is inherently unfair as it 
diminishes the asset pool available for plaintiffs to recover from and could 
result in tort victims remaining uncompensated. 
As to the first problem of moral hazard, restricting directors’ and 
officers’ liability for torts in the manner as suggested here would arguably 
not, by itself, be a reason for encouraging misconduct.  Even with a 
reduced threat of personal liability, alternative monitoring devices such as 
market pressures and non-legal consequences for bad acts may deter 
directors and officers.  For instance, directors and officers could face loss 
of employment, reputational risks, and restrictions on future 
employment.251  Furthermore, conduct by agents can be, to some extent, 
self-controlled.  Behavioral theories suggest that a corporate actor would 
                                                           
 248. Admittedly, the distinction between simple and gross negligence (and other degrees 
of culpability) remains murky.  Nevertheless, using a gross negligence standard is useful in 
that it signals that a heightened degree of culpability is necessary to impose liability. 
 249. In order to preserve the director’s or officer’s increased protection for cases of 
external duty breaches, the corporation—if held vicariously liable—could only ask to be 
indemnified in cases of gross negligence.  See supra note 241. 
 250. This is the problem of moral hazard.  See supra note 239 and accompanying text. 
 251. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 179, at 171–73 (discussing directors’ reputational 
concerns). 
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obey his duties out of his own volition and not only out of fear of incurring 
pecuniary liability.252  In addition, directors and officers have incentives not 
to pursue activities that could create vicarious tort liability for the 
corporation as financial harm to the corporation can negatively impact their 
own compensation and ultimately threaten their jobs and livelihood.253  
Moreover, shifting the risk of doing business from the corporation to its 
directors and officers is not the appropriate solution for ensuring that they 
will not engage in wrongdoing. 
With regard to the second criticism, a lack of fairness for potential tort 
victims, it is admittedly true that limiting individual corporate actors’ 
liability increases the chances that a third party may remain 
uncompensated.  If the corporation is insolvent and corporate agents cannot 
be the subject of any claims, the tort creditor may not have sufficient 
recourse.  Of course, considerable sympathy is aroused for anyone injured 
by tortious conduct and, from the tort victim’s perspective, limiting 
personal liability could be seen as unfair.254  Still, tort victims’ interest in 
compensation must be weighed against the factors which speak in favor of 
limiting directors’ and officers’ personal liability, and the proposal here 
concludes that, under most circumstances, the interests in limiting 
directors’ and officers’ liability outweigh the potential unfairness that tort 
victims could face. 
Finally, critics may point out that directors and officers are already 
protected from personal liability for third-party tort claims by 
indemnification and insurance and that, therefore, any changes in this area 
of the law are moot.255  However, as a practical matter, plaintiffs are most 
                                                           
 252. See Michael B. Dorff, Softening Pharaoh’s Heart:  Harnessing Altruistic Theory 
and Behavioral Law and Economics to Rein in Executive Salaries, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 811, 
857–77 (2003) (discussing the application of altruistic theory in corporate governance);  
see also Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social 3orms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 
1291 (1999) (“In the loyalty area, social norms increase efficiency by supplementing the 
roles of liability rules and monitoring and bonding systems.”). 
 253. See Bainbridge, supra note 180, at 533–34; Glynn, supra note 66, at 381. 
 254. In general, limited shareholder liability has been described as immoral and as 
encouraging an immoral attitude in commercial dealings.  See Ben Pettet, Limited Liability–
A Principle for the 21st Century?, in 48 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 1995, PART 2:  
COLLECTED PAPERS 125, 142–43, 154 (1995). 
 255. All states have indemnification statutes in place, usually in their corporate laws.  
See FANTO, supra note 208, at § 8:3.1.  For example, in suits brought by third parties, 
Delaware law allows a corporation to indemnify directors and officers for expenses, 
judgments, fines, and amounts paid in settlement, provided that the director of officer acted 
in good faith.  See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b).   
A corporation must indemnify a director or officer who “has been successful on the merits 
or otherwise,” without regard to whether the director or officer acted in good faith or not.  
See id. § 145(c); Waltuch v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 88 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir. 1996).  In 
addition to indemnification pursuant to corporate law statutes, a director or officer may have 
additional indemnification rights under the corporation’s charter or bylaws, or under a 
contractual agreement with the corporation.  See FANTO, supra note 208, at § 8:3.2.  
Moreover, corporations can purchase D&O insurance to protect directors and officers from 
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likely to proceed against directors and officers personally when the 
corporation is insolvent or bankrupt.256  In these instances, indemnification 
agreements between directors and  
officers and the corporation can be worthless.  Similarly, experience  
shows that the protection offered by insurance—if insurance has  
been purchased at all—is incomplete.  Insurance policies contain numerous 
important exclusions,257 D&O insurers may be reluctant to pay or can 
become insolvent, and, moreover, the bankruptcy of a corporation can 
remove some or all of the insurance protections for directors and 
officers.258  In addition, insurance is capped,259 and disputes between 
current and former directors (and officers) may lead to disagreement over 
the proper allocation and distribution of D&O insurance proceeds.260 
Finally, even if directors and officers—for example due to insurance 
coverage or indemnification—are not obliged to make payments 
themselves, this cannot per se serve as an argument against a change in the 
rules governing directors’ and officers’ liability, where such changes are 
supported by doctrinal considerations and tend to produce more efficient 
overall outcomes. 
CONCLUSION  
Directors’ and officers’ liability under corporate and securities laws 
continues to be a hotly debated subject.  Interestingly, however, their 
liability toward non-shareholder third parties under common tort law and 
statutory provisions has generated relatively modest scholarly interest.  
                                                           
losses arising out of “wrongful acts” for which they are not indemnified (referred to as “Side 
A” coverage).  See FANTO, supra note 208, at § 8:4; Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith,  
The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance:  The Directors’ & Officers’ Liability 
Insurer, 95 GEO. L.J. 1795, 1801–06 (2007). 
 256. See FANTO, supra note 208, at § 8:4.4[C].  The stay provision of the Bankruptcy 
Code does generally not apply to solvent directors and officers as codefendants of a debtor 
corporation.  See supra note 6. 
 257. See Dan A. Bailey, D&O Policy Commentary, in D&O LIABILITY & INSURANCE IN A 
SARBANES-OXLEY WORLD 163, 176–85 (2003) (discussing typical D&O policy exclusions).  
For example, liability under the responsible corporate officer doctrine is not necessarily 
covered by D&O liability insurance.  See supra note 195.  Two prominent cases, In re 
WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 388 F. Supp. 2d 319, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) and In re Enron 
Corp. Sec. Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., 391 F. Supp. 2d 541,  
569–70 (S.D. Tex. 2005), very clearly expose some of the weaknesses of D&O insurance. 
 258. See FANTO, supra note 208, at § 8:4.4[I]; Anthony K. Greene, 3ew Risks for 
Directors and Officers, in D&O LIABILITY & INSURANCE IN A SARBANES-OXLEY WORLD 
247, 252 (2003) (noting that D&O insurers denied insurance coverage to Enron due to 
financial misstatements). 
 259. See Greene, supra note 258, at 253 (delineating coverage plans and corresponding 
policy limits). 
 260. A recent high-profile example is the dispute over the proceeds of AIG’s primary 
D&O insurance policy.  See Kevin LaCroix, Interpleader:  AIG, Greenberg and D&O 
Policy Proceeds, D&O DIARY, May 12, 2009, http://www.dandodiary.com/ 
2009/05/articles/d-o-insurance/interpleader-aig-greenberg-and-do-policy-proceeds. 
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Meanwhile, courts have developed various approaches for imposing on 
directors and officers tort liability for supervision, management, and other 
conduct.  The case law in this area is plentiful and often difficult to 
reconcile261 and trends such as liability for “controlling persons” have 
increased directors’ and officers’ liability exposure. 
This Article has explored different ideas in support of restricting 
directors’ and officers’ liability for supervision and management.  What has 
emerged, in the end, is a proposal for a novel model of corporate liability, 
centered around the nature of directors’ and officers’ duties and with a 
focus on the individual’s state of mind.  Thus, for breaches of internal 
duties, including supervision and management, directors and officers 
should not incur personal liability, except where they act with the intention 
to inflict harm upon third parties.  Conversely, directors and officers should 
remain liable for breaches of external duties, provided, however, that their 
conduct was at least grossly negligent. 
Most importantly, at its core, this Article and the proposed model are 
based on the belief that modern tort law should not treat individual 
corporate actors in the same manner as any other individual.  Instead, it 
should account for the fact that directors and officers act on behalf of and 
for the benefit of the corporation.  As a result, to preserve the corporate 
shield, liability standards in tort law should not conflate the standards 
imposed on individuals with those imposed on directors and officers. 
 
                                                           
 261. This unsatisfying state of matters is reflected in the title of an article by two 
California practitioners.  See Allen B. Grodsky & B. Alexander Moghaddam, Making It 
Personal, L.A. LAW., Dec. 2004, at 24. 
